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Abstract 
 
JRC supported the DG MARKT by developing quantitative analyses for the preparation of the second level 
legislation on bank contributions to be paid to the EU national Resolution Funds and to the Single Resolution Fund
SRF for countries participating to the Banking Union. The present report summarizes all the extensive analyses on 
the calculation of banks contributions supporting the whole policy process. 
All analyses were based on a dataset that JRC built assembling individual bank unconsolidated balance sheet data,
provided directly by the MS. 
JRC developed the technical details to measure the risk profile of each bank. Starting from a selection of balance
sheet indicators, which account for the different aspects of each bank activity, the methodology aggregates them
into a single composite risk indicator. The risk indicator is then combined with the bank size measure to compute
the share of aggregated contribution each bank joining the fund would pay. 
JRC also investigated the decrease in contributions of applying a special treatment for the computation of the small 
banks’ contributions: these banks will not pay contributions based on their risk profile but will be instead lump-sum 
contributions, depending on their size only. 
JRC assessed the sensitivity of the distribution of contributions when changing some elements of the overall 
mechanism used to measure risk and compute contributions. 
Finally, following the discussion at the political level, JRC also assessed some technical issues related to the
calculation of the contribution base and it tested the impact on banks contributions of different options for the 
phasing in of the single resolution fund. 
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Executive Summary 
The European Commission (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) supported the Directorate General for Internal Market 
and Services (DG MARKT) by developing quantitative analyses for the preparation of the second level legislation on 
bank contributions to be paid to the EU national Resolution Funds (RF) as of 1 January 2015 and to the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) that will replace national funds as of 1 January 2016 in all the Member States (MS) 
participating in the Banking Union.  
These analyses laid out the technical framework for determining how such contributions should be defined, taking 
into account the existing legislation in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and in the Single 
Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR). The BRRD establishes that European (EU) countries must set up ex-ante 
funded national RF that can contribute to effective bank resolutions. According to the SRMR, MS participating in the 
Banking Union are required to build a single fund. BRRD and SRMR establish that banks are required to pay annual 
contributions, based on two ingredients: 
1. a basic flat contribution , proportional to the amount of bank’s liabilities excluding own funds and covered 
deposit (the so called BRRD base); 
2. a risk adjustment to take into account the risk profile of each bank. This risk indicator is defined on a number 
of risk criteria, some of which depend upon balance sheet information. 
National RF and the SRF must set aside a fund equal to at least 1% of the amount of covered deposits of all banks 
authorized in the respective banking system (i.e. each MS in the first case and the whole Banking Union in the latter).  
JRC analyses covered a large number of issues and followed the policy evolution taking place during consultations 
with the EC Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance. 
All analyses were based on a dataset that JRC built assembling individual bank unconsolidated balance sheet data, 
provided directly by the MS. The final database comprises around 4,600 banks in the EU-28, accounting for 37 600 
billion € of EU unconsolidated total assets (as of 2012). 
JRC analyses started with the development of a composite risk indicator measuring the risk adjustment mentioned 
in the BRRD and SRMR. It is based on a set of balance sheet indicators identified by DG MARKT and the Expert Group, 
which must be combined into a single measure of risk. JRC analyzed alternative aggregation rules based on 
composite indicators theory. Individual indicators are combined using a set of weights based on expert judgment of 
DG MARKT and the Expert Group. 
JRC also tested various ways of combining the flat contribution with the risk adjustment, to calculate the final fees 
that banks will pay. According to the retained preferred option, included in the second level legislation, each bank 
contributes in proportion to the BRRD base corrected by the risk adjustment which depends on the value of the 
composite risk indicator and ranges between 0.8 and 1.5.  
A different regime applies to small banks: they are required to pay a lump sum, which is lower than the basic flat 
contribution and not depending on the risk profile. The JRC investigated the effects of this special treatment on the 
contributions of all banks.  
JRC calculated the distribution of contributions by bank size: results show that the greater contributors to the (S)RF 
are the largest banks, which pay proportionately more than their share of total assets. For instance, in the Euro area 
the largest 261 banks, which represent 85% of total assets, cover around 90% of the contributions. The analyses also 
demonstrated that in general the smallest banks, among those paying a risk-adjusted contribution, tend to get a 
downward risk-based correction and therefore in large measure pay less than the flat contributions; on the other 
hand, the largest banks mostly get an increase in their contributions with respect to the flat fees. Small banks, though 
representing 55% of the whole number of institutions in the Euro Area, account only for 2% of total assets and their 
lump sum contributions cover 0.3% of the yearly target to be collected. 
Following the discussion at the political level, JRC also assessed some technical issues related to the calculation of 
the BRRD base, including the treatment of intragroup exposures and the accounting rules for derivatives. The 
proposed legislation allows the netting of intragroup exposures in the calculation of the base and the application of 
leverage ratio accounting rules for derivative liabilities, in line with Capital Regulation Directive IV.  
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Due to the complete lack of individual bank-level data both on the level of intra-group exposure and on the structure 
of groups, JRC could not provide a detailed analysis at an individual bank level of the impact of netting intra-group 
loans. Instead, the focus of the analysis was on providing a tentative estimate of the average size and variation of 
intragroup exposures in each MS. 
As for derivative liabilities, individual data were scarce; based on these data, JRC estimated averages amounts of 
derivatives held for groups of banks of different dimensions and used such figures to come up with tentative 
estimates of the potential impact of introducing the leverage ratio treatment in the calculation of the BRRD base. 
Finally, given the potentially large variations in contributions when switching from national targets, imposed by the 
BRRD legislation, to the Banking Union target level of the SRF, the draft Implementing Act foresees an adjustment 
mechanism during an eight years transitional period. This mechanism introduces a gradual blending between 
contributions calculated under the national system and the SRF. JRC tested the impact on banks contributions of 
different options for the phasing in of the SRF. Moreover, JRC tested the effect of an optional special treatment for 
contributions, applicable during the phase-in, to institutions with total assets below 3 billion €.   
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1. Introduction 
The European Commission (EC) adopted a Delegated Act on the 21st October 2014 and a draft proposal for a Council 
Implementing Act on the 24th November 2014 specifying how the contributions of banks to the national resolution 
funds and to the Single Resolution Fund should be calculated. These two funds are established by the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and by the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR). 
The BRRD establishes that EU countries must set up national Resolution Funds (RF), ex-ante funded, that contribute 
to effective bank resolution, e.g. by providing temporary support to distressed banks via loans, guarantees and other 
measures. In the SRM legislation, Resolution Funds of the participating member states are pooled into a Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF). 
According to Article 94 of BRRD and Article 66 of SRMR, the calculation of banks contributions to these funds should 
be based on a flat contribution and a risk adjustment. The former is defined as “pro–rata based on the amount of an 
institution’s liabilities excluding own funds and covered deposits, with respect to the total liabilities, excluding own 
funds and covered deposits, of all the institutions authorised in the territories of the participating Member States 
(MS)”; this is referred to as the BRRD base. The risk adjustment should be based on a number of risk criteria (listed 
in the BRRD Directive), some of which depend upon balance sheet information.1 
The Directorate General for Internal Market and Services (DG MARKT) has asked the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
to run quantitative analyses to determine the effect of alternative rules for the calculation of banks contributions 
to the (S)RF. All the main outcomes of this exercise are included in the Commission staff working document 
accompanying the new rules for both pieces of legislation.2 The present report details all the technical work 
developed by the JRC to support DG MARKT in the preparation of the two Acts. 
JRC analyses covered the following issues. 
 Assembling data collected from MS into a final database. JRC collected, processed and harmonized data 
on banks’ balance sheet directly provided by the MS representatives.3 
 Assessing different approaches to compute contributions of banks taking into account the size and the 
risk profile. JRC proposed different mathematical formulas to compute banks contributions combining the 
BRRD base and the risk adjustment. This report sets down the technical steps to build a robust composite 
indicator able to capture the risk criteria explicitly listed in the BRRD. JRC also investigated the effects on 
individual contributions of applying a special treatment for small banks, which will pay a lump-sum amount, 
and the potential impact of introducing a fourth pillar based on supervisory discretion and data, reflecting 
trading activities, off-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, complexity and resolvability. 
 Estimating the size of intragroup exposures. JRC estimated the magnitude of intragroup liabilities to 
provide an idea of the impact of excluding them from the contribution base. As contributions are calculated 
                                                          
1 Article 94(7) of BRRD states: “The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the notion of adjusting 
contributions in proportion to the risk profile of institutions […], taking into account the following:  
(a) the risk exposure of the institution, including the importance of its trading activities, its off-balance sheet exposures and its 
degree of leverage;  
(b) the stability and variety of the company's sources of funding and unencumbered highly liquid assets;  
(c) the financial condition of the institution; 
(d) the probability that the institution enters into resolution;  
(e) the extent to which the institution has previously benefited from extraordinary public financial support;  
(f) the complexity of the structure of the institution and the resolvability of the institution, and  
(g) the importance of the institution to the stability of the financial system or economy or one or more Member States or of the 
Union.  
(h) the fact that the institution is part of an IPS.” 
2 The figures presented in the Commission Staff Working Document slightly differ from the ones presented in this report: the 
latter are based on an updated dataset including data provided by some MS in early autumn 2014. 
3 Due to confidentiality issues, JRC also set a special (secure) platform to work with these data. For this reason, the present report 
does not show raw balance sheet data at single entity level. 
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at individual entity level, intragroup exposures should be excluded from the base otherwise the same 
liability would be counted twice in the same banking group, thus inducing a kind of double payment. As 
data on intragroup liabilities at a single entity level are missing, JRC used the distribution of interbank 
deposits to obtain a proxy of the average level of intragroup liabilities at country level and its dispersion. 
Though this estimate represents an upper bound proxy for intragroup liabilities, it should be much 
correlated to actual values. 
 Estimating the size of derivatives liabilities. JRC developed a rough estimate of the potential impact on 
banks’ contributions when applying a special treatment for derivative liabilities. In fact, to ensure a 
harmonized approach in the treatment of derivatives, the Delegated Act requires derivatives to be 
accounted for according to the rules for the calculation of the leverage ratio under the Capital Requirements 
Regulation. As no data on derivative liabilities at individual bank level was available, JRC made use of 
Bankscope database to come up with a proxy of the values and then used assumptions on the possible 
scope of application of the rule to assess its impact. 
 Analysing the phase-in methodology. JRC estimated the impact on banks contributions of different options 
for a phase-in of the SRF calculation in the Euro area. The proposal for the Council Implementing Act 
contained transitional measures by way of a gradual phasing-in of the SRM contribution in order to limit 
the sharp change that would arise when moving from the BRRD system, where contributions are 
determined based upon the national target, to the single fund mechanism, where contributions will be paid 
based on a joint target level. 
During the policy process, the EC organized a series of meetings with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and 
Insurance, composed by representatives of the Member States, to discuss the key elements of the proposed rules. 
JRC has been requested to participate to most of the Expert Group meetings, and to present the analyses developed 
and the evidence found in order to feed the policy discussion. 
The remainder of this report is structured as it follows. Section 2 presents the data collection exercise and some 
statistics for the final database the JRC assembled. Section 3 discusses all the mathematical steps to compute the 
composite indicators from raw data and to compute the risk-based contributions for each bank. Sections 4 and 5 
describe the results at banks’ level. Section 4 focuses on “small” banks, which are subject to a specific treatment, 
and Section 5 focuses on the remaining banks. Section 6 presents a scenario analysis simulating results when 
introducing the additional supervisory pillar in the composite indicator, reflecting risks due to trading activities and 
off-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, complexity and resolvability. Section 7 discusses estimates of intragroup 
exposures. Section 8 illustrates the potential effects on contributions of using the leverage ratio accounting 
treatment for derivatives. Section 9 presents some analyses of possible phasing-in mechanisms from the national 
systems to the single fund for member states participating in the Banking Union. Section 10 concludes.  
The present report is accompanied by three annexes. Annex A.1 contains a numerical example on how to compute 
the composite indicator. Annex A.2 discusses the pros and cons of geometric versus arithmetic averages when 
constructing the composite indicator. Annex A.3 shows the different effects of alternative treatments for the right-
tails of the indicators’ distributions. 
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2. The database 
JRC ran a preliminary set of analyses and simulations using Bankscope data, a commercial provider of banks’ balance 
sheet dat. Then, as MS provided JRC with banks data in response to the request launched by DG MARKT on June 
2014, new analyses and simulations were run using the new database made up by data directly provided by the MS, 
unless the database was incomplete or the data were not compliant with what requested (in this case Bankscope 
data were used). This section is devoted to describe the database, to compare it with other sources and to detail the 
steps and the checks performed to detect incoherencies and mistakes to come up with the final and coherent version 
of the database. 
 
 Data comparisons 
The data comparison for each country focuses on the following variables. 
 Number of banks. For each country the total number of banks recorded in Bankscope (irrespective if they 
have data or not), the number of banks from Bankscope that have all the necessary data to perform the 
analyses (hereinafter referred to as JRC sample), the number of all banks recorded in each country's 
database (irrespective of whether they have complete data or not) and the figures published by ECB and 
EBA are compared.4 By doing this, one can have an idea on the quality of coverage of the samples in terms 
of number of banks. Results for all MS are reported in Table 1.  
 Amount of total assets. The sum of total assets of the JRC sample, the original MS sample and country-level 
estimates by EBA are taken into account. This information, combined with the previous one, allows to 
understand which part of the banks' distribution is missing in one database with respect to the other (i.e. if 
a negligible amount of total assets, corresponding to a relevant number of banks is missing, the database is 
likely not to account for data on small banks). All aggregated numbers are shown in Table 2. 
 Amount of deposits and covered deposits. The sum of deposits and covered deposits5 of the JRC sample, 
the original MS sample and country-level estimates JRC has performed using Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
(DGS hereinafter) data6 are taken into account. Also this information allows understanding which part of 
the banks' distribution is missing in one database with respect to the other. 
 Coverage ratio. This variable is defined as the ratio between the total amount of covered deposits and the 
total amount of customer deposits. Two values for this ratio are taken into account: one is the estimate of 
the coverage ratio calculated for each country by JRC using DGS data and the second is the same ratio 
computed using MS data. JRC figures are used in conjunction with Bankscope information on customer 
deposits to obtain estimates of covered deposits for each bank in the JRC sample, and are based on data 
provided by DGS. This estimated coverage ratio is contrasted to the values observed in the sample provided 
by each MS, calculated by dividing the total of customer deposits and covered deposits for all banks with 
available data. All aggregated numbers are shown in Table 3. If these two ratios are different, while the 
                                                          
4 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/aggregate-statistical-data 
5 Customer deposits: any deposit as defined in Article 1(1) of Directive 94/19/EC, excluding those deposits left out from any 
repayment by virtue of Article 2.  
Deposit” shall mean any credit balance which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from 
normal banking transactions and which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, and 
any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a credit institution. 
The following shall be excluded from any repayment by guarantee schemes: 
a) subject to Article 8 (3), deposits made by other credit institutions on their own behalf and for their own account, 
b) all instruments which would fall within the definition of 'own funds' in Article 2 of Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 
April 1989 on the own funds of credit institutions, 
c) deposits arising out of transactions in connection with which there has been a criminal conviction for money laundering 
as defined in Article 1 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system 
for the purpose of money laundering. 
6 For data and methodology of the estimate see G. Cannas, J. Cariboni, L. Kazemi Veisari, A. Pagano: Updated estimates of EU 
eligible and covered deposits, JRC Technical Report JRC87531, 2014. 
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amount of covered deposits in the two samples turns out to be similar, differences could exist in the 
definition of deposits employed in the Bankscope reporting template and by national authorities. 
 
The main underlying assumptions used in the analysis are: 
 All the zeros in the databases provided by MS were treated as "true" zeros. This is done both for cases 
where missing data are clearly distinguished from zero, and for cases where apparently no data points were 
missing. 
 For countries outside Euro area, where data was not already provided in Euro, the exchange rate used for 
the conversion is the end-of-period rate provided by Eurostat. 
 For countries with no data on covered deposits, these are estimated for each bank by applying to MS-
reported deposits the coverage ratio estimated by JRC from DGS data (as done in the JRC sample). However, 
it should be noted that the coverage ratio estimate is based on the definition of customer deposits 
employed in the Bankscope reporting template. Therefore, if the definition of deposits employed by the 
relevant MS were not in line with that of Bankscope, the estimated coverage ratio would not be reliable. 
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Table 1: Number of institutions by country as of 2012 
Number of banks 2012 
Country 
Original 
Bankscope 
Download 
JRC 
sample 
ECB EBA 
Original 
MS data 
AUSTRIA 313 196 751 809 703 
BELGIUM 60 29 103 104 49 
BULGARIA 25 17 31 31 26 
CYPRUS 26 6 137 135 13 
CZECH REPUBLIC 24 12 56 43 23 
GERMANY 1741 1617 1869 1737 1799 
DENMARK 92 61 161 106 95 
ESTONIA 9 3 16 16 8 
SPAIN 148 99 314 302 104 
FINLAND 19 16 313 313 289 
FRANCE 284 209 639 381 550 
UNITED KINGDOM 312 127 373 200 193 
GREECE 13 7 52 n.a. 25 
CROATIA 37 23 n.a. n.a. 27 
HUNGARY 30 12 189 172 172 
IRELAND 32 12 472 38 36 
ITALY 605 538 714 706 627 
LITHUANIA 11 8 94 18 8 
LUXEMBOURG 94 61 141 141 111 
LATVIA 21 15 29 29 20 
MALTA 16 11 28 28 23 
NETHERLANDS 57 24 266 122 105 
POLAND 50 33 695 642 616 
PORTUGAL 42 18 152 186 145 
ROMANIA 29 18 39 n.a.  31 
SWEDEN 102 67 176 113 142 
SLOVENIA 22 17 23 21 20 
SLOVAKIA 17 7 28 31 29 
TOTAL 4,231 3,263 7,861 6,424 5,989 
Note: purple cells are figures as of 2013. 
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Table 2: Total assets by country as of 2012 
Total Assets 2012 
Country ECB (b€) EBA (b€) 
JRC 
sample 
(b€) 
Original 
MS data 
(b€) 
AUSTRIA 974 982 465 903 
BELGIUM 1085 1099 550 996 
BULGARIA 45 42 34 40 
CYPRUS 128 111 17 43 
CZECH REPUBLIC 192 184 104 167 
GERMANY 8219 8593 6171 8364 
DENMARK 1158 1042 545 571 
ESTONIA 20 19 12 13 
SPAIN 3574 3145 1673 2785 
FINLAND 597 619 433 582 
FRANCE 7712 7128 7052 8555 
UNITED KINGDOM 9553 8678 8277 8679 
GREECE 441 n.a. 148 301 
CROATIA 58 n.a. 52 8 
HUNGARY 107 102 39 96 
IRELAND 1124 951 786 1014 
ITALY 4211 3803 2959 3199 
LITHUANIA 24 23 19 18 
LUXEMBOURG 868 735 497 656 
LATVIA 28 28 23 25 
MALTA 53 53 20 52 
NETHERLANDS 2490 2688 1766 2476 
POLAND 354 336 230 302 
PORTUGAL 556 508 402 466 
ROMANIA 91 0 63 74 
SWEDEN 1211 1756 795 1230 
SLOVENIA 51 45 41 45 
SLOVAKIA 60 56 32 58 
TOTAL 44,984 42,727 33,203 41,719 
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Table 3: Amount of deposits and covered deposits as of 2012 
  
Customer Deposits 2012 Covered Deposits 2012 coverage Ratio  
Country 
JRC 
estimates 
from DGS 
(b€) 
JRC 
sample 
(b€) 
Original 
MS data 
(b€) 
JRC 
estimates 
from DGS 
(b€) 
JRC 
sample 
(b€) 
Original MS 
data (b€) 
JRC DGS 
survey 
Original 
MS data 
AUSTRIA 325 185 577 173 99 183 53% 32% 
BELGIUM 529 281 712 229 122 n.a. 43% n.a. 
BULGARIA 29 26 32 18 16 19 63% 58% 
CYPRUS 104 13 53 52 7 n.a. 50% n.a. 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
124 64 114 65 34 65 53% 57% 
GERMANY 3172 2767 3292 1575 1374 n.a. 50% n.a. 
DENMARK 167 198 233 105 125 n.a. 63% n.a. 
ESTONIA 11 8 11 5 4 5 49% 49% 
SPAIN 1569 750 1917 675 322 816 43% 43% 
FINLAND 137 98 141 78 56 73 57% 51% 
FRANCE 1577 2026 2198 1103 1417 1099 70% 53% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
2922 2825 2905 1219 1178 n.a. 42% 30% 
GREECE 175 77 206 105 46 n.a. 60% n.a. 
CROATIA n.a. 32 6 n.a. 17 0.2 54%* 3% 
HUNGARY 60 19 131 30 9 44 50% 33% 
IRELAND 194 185 202 80 76 n.a. 41% n.a. 
ITALY 1512 956 958 490 555 547 58% 57% 
LITHUANIA 13 12 12 7 6 6 50% 47% 
LUXEMBOURG 216 195 494 30 28 30 14% 6% 
LATVIA 18 16 16 6 5 6 34% 36% 
MALTA 28 13 27 7 3 n.a. 25% 31% 
NETHERLANDS 864 626 1072 447 324 451 52% 42% 
POLAND 279 153 216 103 57 n.a. 37% n.a. 
PORTUGAL 222 187 307 110 93 129 50% 42% 
ROMANIA 64 36 64 27 15 28 43% 43% 
SWEDEN 267 292 329 141 154 24 53% 7% 
SLOVENIA 24 23 30 15 15 15 63% 50% 
SLOVAKIA 46 23 42 24 12 28 53% 65% 
TOTAL 14,646 12,088 16,296 6,922 6,171 3,565 49% 40% 
Note: purple cells are figures as of 2013; * JRC estimates. 
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Table 4: Deposits over total assets 
Deposits / total assets 
Country 
JRC 
sample 
Original 
MS data 
AUSTRIA 40% 64% 
BELGIUM 51% 71% 
BULGARIA 76% 82% 
CYPRUS 81% 88% 
CZECH REPUBLIC 62% 68% 
GERMANY 45% 39% 
DENMARK 36% 41% 
ESTONIA 71% 80% 
SPAIN 45% 69% 
FINLAND 23% 24% 
FRANCE 29% 26% 
UNITED KINGDOM 34% 33% 
GREECE 52% 62% 
CROATIA 62% 85% 
HUNGARY 47% 136% 
IRELAND 24% 20% 
ITALY 32% 30% 
LITHUANIA 63% 66% 
LUXEMBOURG 39% 75% 
LATVIA 69% 65% 
MALTA 63% 52% 
NETHERLANDS 35% 43% 
POLAND 66% 72% 
PORTUGAL 47% 66% 
ROMANIA 57% 86% 
SWEDEN 37% 27% 
SLOVENIA 57% 76% 
SLOVAKIA 72% 73% 
AVERAGE 51% 61% 
Note: purple cells are figures as of 2013. 
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 Final database 
Data provided either by Bankscope or by MS cannot be directly used to run all the simulations and analyses, but 
some checks and imputations are needed in order to guarantee the coherence of the data collected and of the final 
results based on them. Depending on the data sources, different treatments need to be performed. In the following 
all the steps taken before coming up with the final database will be detailed. 
 
2.2.1 Imputations and checks on data from Bankscope 
Bankscope database reports data on Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) and capital for few banks only. In order to come 
up with a reliable estimate of these items, the following steps have been implemented. 
1. RWA estimates from Total and Tier 1 capital and corresponding ratios. 
In Bankscope the following variables are available: Total regulatory capital, Tier 1 capital, Total regulatory capital 
ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio and RWA. 
Where not available, RWA is estimated in one of the following ways (and it is labelled RWA*): 
𝑅𝑊𝐴∗ =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
  𝑜𝑟  𝑅𝑊𝐴∗ =  
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
. 
2. Capital estimates from RWA, RWA* and ratios. 
Matching original available data and RWA’, capital is computed as it follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙∗ = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝐴∗   𝑜𝑟   𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝐴 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙∗ = 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝐴∗   𝑜𝑟   𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝐴. 
3. Clean up the dataset. 
Banks are removed from the sample when they meet at least one of the following criteria: 
 Total assets not available 
 Common equity not available 
 Tier 1 capital > total assets 
 Total capital > total assets 
 Common equity > total assets 
 Total capital plus customer deposits > total assets (this is a conservative approach to guarantee that the 
BRRD base is not negative). 
4. Robust regression to estimate capital 
For every banks’ specialization7 the following linear models are considered: 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙∗∗ =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙∗∗ =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
                                                          
7 Bankscope provides a classification of banks according to their specialization. For the purpose of the present analysis the 
following classifications has been considered.  
 Commercial banks: mainly active in a combination of Retail Banking (Individuals, SMEs), Wholesale Banking (large 
corporates) and Private banking (not belonging to groups of  saving banks, co-operative banks). 
 Cooperative banks: banks that have a cooperative ownership structure and are mainly active in Retail Banking 
(Individuals, SMEs). 
 Saving banks: mainly active in Retail Banking (Individuals, SMEs) and usually belonging to a group of savings banks. 
 Private banking & asset management companies: banks mainly active in private banking and asset management. 
 Real estates and mortgage banks: mainly active in mortgage financing and project development. 
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JRC estimates parameters by means of a linear regression, without considering outliers, and then applies them 
to estimate capitals from common equity. 
5. RWA estimates with new capital data 
JRC performs the same computations as those described in Step 1 using data on capital estimated via the above 
regressions Total regulatory capital ratio estimates. 
For those banks without Total regulatory capital ratio, JRC approximates it with ECB solvency ratios at country 
level8. 
6. RWA estimates with new ratios  
Repeat the same computations of step 1 to estimate RWA starting from ECB solvency ratios. 
Covered deposits are estimated for all banks starting from deposits and applying the coverage ratio estimated by 
JRC based on DGS data. 
2.2.2 Imputations and checks on data from MS 
Also data provided by MS have to be processed in order to remove banks with incongruities in the data. Before 
proceeding with the checks and assumptions, all the banks with some missing data in at least one of the variables 
necessary to build the database are deleted. 
Assumptions to estimate some missing data: 
 Common Equity is approximated with the Common equity Tier 1 or, in case the latter is missing, with Tier 1 
capital. 
 Total capital is approximated with the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
 If data on covered deposits are missing, they are estimated from customer deposits by applying the average 
coverage ratio estimated at country level by JRC. 
The following checks are performed: 
 Total assets >Total Capital. 
 Total assets >Common equity. 
 Total assets > Deposits plus total capital (this is a conservative approach to check that the BRRD base is not 
negative). 
 Deposits > Covered deposits. 
 Deposits > 0 (otherwise the ratio loans over deposits cannot be computed). 
 Total Capital > 0. 
If a bank does not fulfil one of the above constraints, it is removed from the database. 
2.2.3 Composition of the final database 
Table 5 shows the composition of the final database that has been built using data from JRC sample and from MS. 
As already mentioned, MS data have been used when all requested data were provided and there is no need for 
additional details, otherwise JRC sample is used. For 3 MS data are as of 2013 as they claimed these figures are more 
representative of their banking systems. 
 
Table 5: Data source for each MS for the new database 
MS 
AT BE BG CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB 
HR IE IT LT LU LV MT PL PT RO SE SK 
JRC HU 
MS (2013 DATA) CY GR NL SI 
                                                          
8 Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/consolidated/html/index.en.html 
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Among the countries that provided a comprehensive database, there are some that did not provide any data on 
covered deposits: they can be estimated starting from deposits and applying the coverage ratio estimated by JRC 
based on DGS data, but particular attention should be paid to the concordance of the definitions of deposits 
employed to estimate the coverage ratio and to report data provided by MS. The list of MS whose covered deposits 
have been estimated from customer deposits can be found in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Source of covered deposits 
2012 covered deposits estimated 
from customer deposits 
MS data: BE, CY, DE, DK, GR, IE, MT§, PL, GB§, 
SE* 
Bankscope data: HU 
2012 covered deposits provided by 
MS 
AT, BG, CZ, EE, ES, FI, FR, HR, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, 
PT, RO, SI, SK 
Note: * provided data on covered deposits for selected banks only; § covered deposits 
estimated from customer deposits by applying the coverage ratio computed using 2013 MS 
data 
 
The following Table 7 and Table 8 show the composition of the final database in terms of number of banks and 
amount of total assets for each MS. It is important to stress that the last column in both tables shows the percentage 
number/amount of total assets corresponding to the removed banks. 
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Table 7: Final composition of the database in terms of number of banks 
Country 
Final Data 
Source used 
Number of banks 2012 
ECB EBA 
Original 
Db from 
MS 
Final 
Database 
% 
removed 
AUSTRIA MS data 751 809 703 668 5% 
BELGIUM MS data 103 104 49 45 8% 
BULGARIA MS data 31 31 26 24 8% 
CYPRUS MS data 137 135 13 10 23% 
CZECH REPUBLIC MS data 56 43 23 23 0% 
GERMANY MS data 1869 1737 1799 1740 3%  
DENMARK MS data 161 106 95 70 26% 
ESTONIA MS data 16 16 8 6 25% 
SPAIN MS data 314 302 104 62 40% 
FINLAND MS data 313 313 289 266 8% 
FRANCE MS data 639 381 550 195 65% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
MS data 373 200 193 177 8% 
GREECE MS data 52 n.a. 25 10 60% 
CROATIA MS data n.a. n.a. 27 21 22% 
HUNGARY Bankscope 189 172 172 12   
IRELAND MS data 472 38 36 31 14% 
ITALY MS data 714 706 627 595 5% 
LITHUANIA MS data 94 18 8 7 13% 
LUXEMBOURG MS data 141 141 111 105 5% 
LATVIA MS data 29 29 20 19 5% 
MALTA MS data 28 28 23 19 17% 
NETHERLANDS MS data 266 122 105 48 54% 
POLAND MS data 695 642 616 245 60% 
PORTUGAL MS data 152 186 145 123 15% 
ROMANIA MS data 39 n.a. 31 25 19% 
SWEDEN MS data 176 113 142 64 55% 
SLOVENIA MS data 23 21 20 17 15% 
SLOVAKIA MS data 28 31 29 12 59% 
TOTAL   7,861 6,424 5,989 4,639 26% 
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Table 8: Final composition of the database in terms of amount of total assets 
Country 
Final Data 
Source used 
Total Assets 2012 b€ 
ECB EBA 
Original 
Db from 
MS 
Final 
Database 
% 
removed 
AUSTRIA MS data 974 982 903 879 3% 
BELGIUM MS data 1085 1099 996 936 6% 
BULGARIA MS data 45 42 40 39 1% 
CYPRUS MS data 128 111 59* 55* 8% 
CZECH REPUBLIC MS data 192 184 167 167 0% 
GERMANY MS data 8219 8593 8364  8267 1% 
DENMARK MS data 1158 1042 571 567 1% 
ESTONIA MS data 20 19 13 13 5% 
SPAIN MS data 3574 3145 2785 2409 13% 
FINLAND MS data 597 619 582 487 16% 
FRANCE MS data 7712 7128 8555 6466 24% 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
MS data 9553 8678 8679 8365 4% 
GREECE MS data 441 n.a. 330* 317* 4% 
CROATIA MS data 58.063 n.a. 8 7 8% 
HUNGARY Bankscope 107 102   39   
IRELAND MS data 1124 951 1014 979 3% 
ITALY MS data 4211 3803 3199 3163 1% 
LITHUANIA MS data 24 23 18 17 6% 
LUXEMBOURG MS data 868 735 656 635 3% 
LATVIA MS data 28 28 24.914 24.908 0.02% 
MALTA MS data 53 53 52 28 47% 
NETHERLANDS MS data 2490 2688 2243* 2034* 9% 
POLAND MS data 354 336 302 290 4% 
PORTUGAL MS data 556 508 466 443 5% 
ROMANIA MS data 91 n.a. 74 66 11% 
SWEDEN MS data 1211 1756 1230 836 32% 
SLOVENIA MS data 51 45 39* 37* 7% 
SLOVAKIA MS data 60 56 58 51 12% 
TOTAL         37,614 9% 
Note: * refer to 2013 data 
 
  
Financial and Economic Analysis Unit  March 2015 
18 
 
3. Procedures and methods to build the composite risk indicator and simulate 
the contributions to be paid to Resolution Funds in the EU 
This section provides details on the procedures and methods developed by JRC to calculate the composite risk 
indicators used as risk adjustment and to allocate the payments of contributions to Resolution Funds in the EU. It 
also focuses on some relevant technical issues that must be taken into account when preparing the legislation due 
to the intrinsic statistical characteristics of the dataset. 
Section 3.1 provides details on the construction of the composite indicator while Section 3.2 looks at alternative 
models for the allocation of the risk based contributions.  
 From balance sheet data to composite indicator: mathematical steps 
According to Articles 94 of the BRRD and 66 of SRM Directive, the contributions banks would have to pay are not 
only based on their size, but also on their risk profile. This risk profile should account for a number of risky aspects 
of the banks’ functioning which are listed in Article 94 of the BRRD. In order to translate the risk behaviour of each 
bank into a single numerical measure, JRC computes what in the following will referred to as risk indicator or 
composite indicator.9 In general terms, a composite indicator is a mathematical aggregation of a set of indicators; 
within this framework, the aggregation is made using a set of balance sheet data and ratios that reflect different 
behaviours of the banks functioning. A composite indicator has some advantages (a comprehensive list can be found 
in the link reported in footnote 9), the most relevant is that it can be used to summarise complex or multi-
dimensional issues into a single dimension. However, it may also lead to misleading messages if it is poorly 
constructed and thus a robust statistical analysis is necessary to corroborate its robustness. 
In the following the steps used to compute the composite indicator will be detailed, starting from raw banks’ balance 
sheet data from a dataset comprising N banks. This composite indicator is used as risk adjustment and combined 
with the flat base, as detailed in the next section. The balance sheet ratios currently used to compute the risk 
adjustment in this report are presented in the following Table 9. Ratios which describe similar risk features are 
grouped into pillars, which are shown in the first column of the Table.  
 
Table 9: Balance sheet ratios used to build the composite indicator. 
Pillar Indicator Definition 
RISK EXPOSURE 
RWA/TA Risk Weighted Assets / Total Assets 
CE/TA Common Equity / Total Assets 
Cap/RWA Regulatory Capital/Risk Weighted Assets 
STABILITY AND VARIETY OF FUNDING Loans/Dep Customer Loans / Customer Deposits 
IMPORTANCE OF THE INSTITUTION TO THE 
STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Share IB+ + IB- 
(Interbank loans + interbank deposits)/Sum of (Interbank loans + 
interbank deposits) at EU level 
 
Important notes:  
1. The list of indicators has been discussed with DG MARKT the Commission Expert Group on Banking 
Payments and Insurance.10 Any change in the list of indicators and/or introduction of additional pillars 
should be carefully assessed and thus the Delegated Acts should contain a revision clause (see also below). 
                                                          
9 Detailed information on composite indicators can be found at https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
10 The complete list of balance sheet ratios that the Commission has proposed includes  
 Pillar risk exposure: Bail-in able funds and Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (in addition to the others); 
 Pillar Stability and Variety of Funding: Liquidity Coverage ratio and net Stable Fund ratio (substituting the loan to deposit 
ratio); 
 Additional pillar to the discretion of the resolution authority.  
Quantitative data on these ratios are not available and thus cannot be included in the present analysis.  
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2. The Commission allows the Resolution Authority to include an additional pillar covering other risk factors. 
It should be noted that the robustness of the composite indicator and its statistical coherence can be 
undermined if additional indicators are added without a statistical assessment (see also below). 
The shape of the distribution of the ratios for the banks in the Euro Area11 is characterized by the presence of a long 
tail on the right. Figure 1 shows the values of these ratios for the sample of roughly 3900 banks in the Euro area 
considered in the JRC analyses, with data as of 201212. Each plot refers to a different ratio, which is plotted on the y 
axis from its minimum to its maximum value; the x axis represents the banks in the sample. For all ratios one can 
observe on the right hand part of the graph a small set of banks with extreme values. This part of the distribution is 
referred to as a right fat tail.13,14 
 
Figure 1: Original values of the balance sheet ratios used for the computation of the risk composite indicator. 
  
In building the composite indicator, the right fat tail and in particular its extreme values should be treated in some 
way, since their presence could be highly problematic. For instance the fact that most of the range of variation of a 
ratio is populated by a small number of banks (e.g. the number of banks with CE/TA greater than 40% is roughly 50, 
representing 1% of the complete sample) can affect the statistical properties of the composite indicators.  
 
The popular ways of treating such tail are: 
 Winsorization, i.e. pulling the most extreme values of the ratios back towards the centre of the distribution 
by substituting extreme values of the indicators with a “limit” value which is high but not extreme; 
                                                          
11 Similar behaviour is observed for the MS not participating in the Banking Union. 
12 Data for CY, GR and SI, which have been provided directly by these MS, are as of December 2013. 
13 In reality the CE/TA indicator has a right fat tail after being “inverted” to reflect the sign of its influence on total risk, as detailed 
in step 2 of the procedure for the construction of the composite indicator, presented in the next section. In other words, the 
problem with this indicator, for which low values are associated with increasing risk, are not too many extremely high but too 
many extremely low values. 
14 The term refers to the fact that a histogram or probability density function for the indicator would have far more points in the 
“right tail” (i.e. extremely high values for indicators with “positive sign” and extremely low values for indicators with “negative 
sign”, see step 2 of the composite indicator construction procedure in the next section) than what would be expected in a Normal 
or Gaussian distribution. 
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 Discretization, i.e. dividing the points into a number of bins and substituting the original values of the 
indicators with the order number of the bin to which each point is assigned, thus leading to grouping all 
extreme values in the top-ranked bin. 
The next Section 3.1.1 presents examples of the fat tail treatment. The other steps for constructing the composite 
indicator are performed after treating the fat tail and are presented in Section 3.1.2. 
 
3.1.1 Right fat tail treatment 
Doing nothing for treating the right fat tail in the distribution of risk indicators is not an acceptable option as this 
would mean that: 
1. Most of the range available to “score” the indicator in the composite would be occupied by a tiny minority 
of points; 
2. This means that the vast majority of points will be densely packed in a very limited space, concentrating 
points with “normal” values of the indicator and points with large or very large values, but not as extreme 
as the most extreme points in the sample; 
3. As a consequence, points which are associated with values of the indicator which could normally be 
considered a sign of high riskiness (e.g. Risk Weighted Assets of more than 80% of Total Assets, or values of 
Capital to Total Assets below 5%) would receive a very low score and appear not to be “high risk” by 
comparison to the mass of the sample; 
4. On the other hand, only those points that are extremely high in a single dimension, by receiving a single 
“off scale” score would be assigned a high score for the overall composite, and stand out as the only riskier 
institutions. 
5. As a result, basically all of the sample ends up possessing a set of very low, extremely similar set of values 
for the indicator (see Figure 2 below), with just a few points receiving a very high value which is very 
different from the average value for the vast majority of the population. (i.e. it seems that all risk is 
concentrated in an extremely limited number of banks15). 
 
                                                          
15 In fact, completely extreme values of the indicators could also be due particular circumstances such as extraordinary 
operations, or to peculiarities in the implementation of the business model rather than to actual extremely risky behavior 
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Figure 2: Distribution of the composite indicator for the Euro area with no treatment of the right fat tails of the 
indicators. Banks are sorted in ascending value of the composite indicator. 
 
 
As specified above, the two procedures considered to deal with this problem were: 
1. Winsorization: the winsorization procedures work by identifying a “cut-off value” which is high but not “too 
extreme” either using a fixed rule or given the characteristics of the distribution and then substituting it for 
all values which are greater than the limit.  
2. Discretization: the discretization procedure works by identifying an optimal number of buckets or bins in 
which to divide the points of the sample, then assigning each point to a bucket according to some pre-
defined rule, with an identical value being assigned to all points in each bucket.  
Both procedures require the identification of a rule to select the cut-off value or the number of buckets. These are 
common problems tackled in the scientific literature of several different fields and a large number of highly efficient 
methods are offered, but most of them require discretion by the operator or the performance of highly complex 
optimization procedures. A choice was therefore made in favor of a transparency and simplicity: the JRC 
concentrated on methods which would exclude discretion by the operator and keep the need for specialized 
knowledge to the bare essential. This means that in both cases a simple, accepted, “rule of thumb” for the 
determination of the cut-off points or the number of bins was adopted, based on the number of points in the sample 
and their dispersion. Where necessary several commonly employed parameterizations or rules to assign values to 
buckets where tested. 
After an initial phase, three alternative approaches where retained for further testing: 
a. A “light” winsorization, where 1% of the points at the top are discarded and substituted with the cut-off 
value sitting at 99% of the distribution. This is an amount normally advised in statistical manuals to calculate 
more robust sample statistics. 
b. A “strong” winsorization, where 10% of the points at the top are discarded and substituted with cut-off 
value sitting at 90% of the distribution. This s approach is commonly used with data known to come from 
distribution with extreme right tails and is employed also by the FDIC to determine the reference ranges to 
build their own risk indicators. 
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c. A discretization where the rule for determining the optimal number of buckets is the widely used rule of 
thumb known as Doane’s rule,16 which provides a number of buckets based on the dimension of the sample 
and on the size of its right tail. Points are assigned to buckets so that each bucket contains the same number 
of points (a methodology advised in older scientific literature to discretize distributions with a very heavy 
right tail). All points in the same bucket are then given the value of the order of the bucket, counting from 
the left to the right (i.e. points in the leftmost bucket get a value of 1, those in the following bucket get a 
two …). 
A worked out example of how the three methods perform on a single indicator is presented in Annex A.3. 
After testing alternative combinations of parameters, discretization seems to be a preferable option, based on the 
following observations: 
Winsorization: 
 Is extremely easy to implement 
 Both light and strong winsorization are rather efficient in reducing the range of variation of the indicator, 
but produce a concentration of points at the “cut-off value” and do not fully avoid the problem of extremely 
penalizing banks which are extreme in a single dimension. 
 It does not affect the distribution of points with lower values, this could be seen as good as it limits 
manipulation of the original data, but this also seems to imply that points that are associated with sensibly 
different values of the indicator (in terms of its risk implications) are still left “too close”; 
 A strong winsorization will accentuate the “concentration” of the distribution at the top end, but will result 
in a smoother distribution in the middle and lower ranges, dealing better with the problems of excess 
penalization and better discriminating points in the mass of the distribution which are different in terms of 
their risk implications. 
 As a results of these two properties, winsorization, especially the “strong” version, tends to produce a 
“lumpy” distribution for the composite risk indicators, with banks more or less concentrated in several 
clumps with very similar values for the indicator. “Light winsorization” will tend to produce clustering 
towards the lower end of the range, and a small set of institutions possessing a maximum value which is 
very different from the average of the rest of the population, while “strong” winsorization will tend to 
produce clustering at the top end. 
Discretization: 
 Is easy to implement; 
 Is extremely efficient in reducing the range of variation of the indicator, at the small cost of assigning an 
identical value to all points assigned to the same bucket ( but points tend to end up in different buckets for 
different indicators); 
 It does affect the distribution of points with lower values. This introduces a further manipulation of the data 
but seems to be very efficient in discriminating points which are associated with sensibly different values 
of the indicators (in terms of risk implications), at the cost of introducing a risk of sometimes “separating” 
points which are very close in terms of risk implications; 
 As a result of these two properties, it tends to produce a very “smooth” distribution for the composite risk 
indicator, with banks spread out over a larger range of values. This approach guarantees that institutions 
which possess a single extreme value are grouped in the top ranked bin, which is not too far away from the 
bin with values higher than the average of the overall population, but not so extreme. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Alternative rules were considered, but based on results and on a review of the literature they were discarded. 
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Table 10: Qualitative comparison between winsorization and discretization. 
Method Ease 
Reducing range 
of variation 
Discriminate 
close points 
with different 
risk 
Risk of 
penalizing close 
points with not 
too different 
risk 
Reducing 
extreme 
penalization for 
single extreme 
values 
Smoother 
distribution of 
composite and 
of contributions 
Winsorization (light) ++ + + 0 0 + 
Winsorization (strong) ++ ++ + - + - 
Discretization + ++ ++ - + ++ 
 
An example of the impact of discretization on the final distribution of the indicator is provided in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Distribution of the composite indicator for the Euro area with discretization treatment of the right fat tails 
of the indicators. 
 
Important notes:  
As a final remark, it has to be noted that all methods have the “double hedged” advantage of not needing a 
calibration to a set of absolute values which could be seen as conflicting with supervisory prescriptions (i.e. if the 
cut-offs are set at levels which some supervisors might consider with a different view), but at the same time cannot 
be based on some absolute threshold which is known to be risky based on empirical or theoretical observations. 
 
Technical details for Discretization: 
Doane’s rule give the number of buckets as: 
𝑘 = 1 + log2(𝑛) + log2 (1 +
|𝑔1|
𝜎𝑔1
) 
where: 
𝜎𝑔1 = √
6 ∗ (𝑛 − 2)
(𝑛 + 1) ∗ (𝑛 + 3)
 
with n being the number of points in the sample, and g1 is the sample skewness, defined as: 
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𝑛
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where ?̅? is the sample mean. 
 
In case the number of points cannot be exactly divided by the number of buckets, a number of buckets equal to 
remainder, starting from the first on the left, is given an additional point. (e.g. if there are 3500 points and Doane’s 
rule suggests to use 18 buckets, 194 points should be assigned to each bucket, with a remainder of 8. Thus the first 
8 buckets from the left would be assigned 195 points, and all other 194, giving a total of 3500). 
 
3.1.2 Steps to build the composite indicator 
A composite indicator is built combining individual indicators: in this specific case balance sheet ratios of each 
individual bank are the starting points and the aim is to obtain a single measure of its risk, at a given point in time 
(the reference year is December 201217). As detailed above, all the steps described in the current section are 
performed after the fat right tail treatment.  
Each indicator is associated with a sign (+1 or -1): sign +1 means higher values of the indicator are riskier, sign –1 
means higher values are safer. Table 11 (column C) shows the signs for the indicators used in the aggregation. 
Indicators within the various pillars are assigned weights (columns D) according to the importance of each indicator 
within the pillar. The sum of the weights of the indicators within each pillar must be 1. In this specific case to assess 
the risk exposure of each bank, the risk-weighted asset ratio and the leverage ratio are assigned equal weights. The 
other two pillars contain a single indicator with weight 100%.  
The various pillars are assigned the weights in the last column of Table 11.18 The sum of the weights over all pillars 
must be 1. 
In the remainder of this report the following will hold true: 
- n=1,2,….N will indicate the banks in the sample; 
- j=1,…,J will indicate the pillars (in this case J=3); 
- i=1,…, I will indicate the ratios; 
- Ii,j,n will indicate the value of indicator i of pillar j for bank n; 
 
Table 11: Signs and weights of the indicators/pillars. Signs and weights based on DG MARKT expert judgment. 
A B C D E 
Pillar PIj,n 
Indicator 
Ii,j,n 
Sign 
si,j 
Weight of Indicator 
wi,j 
Weight of Pillar 
Wj 
RISK EXPOSURE 
RWA/TA +1 33.3% 
62.5% CE/TA -1 33.3% 
Cap/RWA -1 33.3% 
STABILITY AND VARIETY OF FUNDING Loans/Dep +1 100% 25% 
IMPORTANCE OF THE INSTITUTION TO THE 
STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Share IB+ + IB- +1 100% 12.5% 
                                                          
17 A statistical analysis of the composite indicator based on a panel of data covering more years would help corroborating the 
robustness of the composite indicator.  
18 DG MARKT provided the JRC with a set of weights covering also the additional ratios and pillars. Since some of the indicators 
from this list are excluded from the analysis due to lack of data, the weights of the remaining are rescaled to sum to 1. 
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In general terms, first information within each pillar is aggregated into a single pillar-indicator (PIj,n) using the weights 
of the indicators; then the pillars are combined into the final composite indicator using the weights of the pillars 
(CIn). Figure 4 exemplifies such two-steps aggregation for our specific set of indicators and pillars. 
 
Figure 4: Aggregation of the ratios/pillars presented in Table 9. 
 
 
A more detailed description of how to build a robust composite indicator can be found in OECD/EC JRC (2008) (see 
the list of references at the end of Annex A.1). 
 
 Step 1: normalization via re-scaling 
Each indicator is rescaled over the range [1-1000] to make all the ratios comparable. The rescaled indicator RI 
for each i, j and n: 
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛 = (1000 − 1) ∗
𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛
−min
𝑛
𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛
max
𝑛
𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛
−min
𝑛
𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛
+ 1        (formula 1) 
The min and the max are taken over all banks in the Euro area for MS participating to the Banking Union and 
over all banks in the national systems for the remaining MS. 
In this way, all indicators are in a common range of values and can be aggregated in a single composite indicator 
without having to worry about different ranges and scales or measurement units. 
The choice of such range depends upon two technical points: 
1. a large range amplifies differences between different values of a ratio. 
2. having an interval which excludes the value 0 is necessary as the formula aggregating various pillars (see 
step 4) multiplies the values of the ratios and thus having a single ratio equal to 0 would imply having the whole 
composite indicator equal to 0, irrespective of the values of the other indicators. 
 
 Step 2: inclusion of the sign assigned 
The following transformation, to account for the sign of the various indicators si,j is applied: 
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛 = {
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑗 = −1
1001 − 𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 1
         (formula 2) 
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This ensures that all Transformed Rescaled Indicators will be higher for safer banks and smaller for riskier banks. 
This step is necessary in the light of step 4, which aggregates the pillars via a geometric average: one of the 
properties of this averaging approach is that it is more sensitive to small values and to their changes. As the final 
composite indicator is meant to capture “bad performances”, indicators with positive signs must be reverted in 
order to have smaller values for riskier banks. 
 
 Step 3: Aggregation WITHIN pillars 
A weighted arithmetic average is employed to aggregate the ratios within each pillar and obtain a single value 
describing the risk that each pillar aims to capture. In our case this aggregation is performed only for the risk 
exposure pillar which contains three indicators: 
𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑛 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑗
𝑖𝑗=1
∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗,𝑛 = 𝑤1𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐼1𝑗,𝑛 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑁𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑗,𝑛             (formula 3) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the weight of indicator i in pillar j (column D of Table 11) and 𝑁𝑗  is the number of indicators within 
pillar j (in our case 3).  
The use of the arithmetic average allows for full compensability among the indicators (see also Annex A.2). This 
means that for example a high value of RWA/TA ratio can be compensated for by sufficiently high value of CE/TA. 
In Section 2.3 potential problems that this type of aggregation can imply are discussed.  
 
 Step 4: Aggregation BETWEEN pillars 
The composite indicator for each bank n is obtained by a geometric weighted average among the various PIj,n: 
𝐶𝐼𝑛 = ∏ 𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑛
𝑊𝑗 = 𝑃𝐼1,𝑛
𝑊1 ∗ … ∗ 𝑃𝐼𝐽,𝑛
𝑊𝐽
𝑗              (formula 4) 
where 𝑊𝑗 is the weight of pillar j (column E of Table 11) and 𝐽 is the number of pillars (in our case 3).  
In our specific case, this means considering the aggregated value of RWA/TA, CE/TA and Cap/RWA and combine 
this single value with the other two indicators. Using a weighted geometric average among pillars has the 
advantage of not allowing for full compensability, since the ratios are multiplied by each other. There are other 
desirable properties of the geometric average with respect to the arithmetic average, which will be detailed and 
exemplified in Annex A.2 below. 
 
 Step 5: computation of the final composite indicator 
As the final composite indicator must be meant as “the higher the riskier”, the following transformation is 
applied: 
𝐶𝐼𝑛 = 1000 − 𝐶𝐼𝑛.       (formula 5) 
A worked example of how these steps should be applied is presented in Annex A.1.  
3.1.3 Other technical issues 
When building a composite indicator, there is a need to perform statistical checks on the data to confirm for instance 
the coherence in the signs assigned to the indicators and in the weights chosen for the indicators/pillars. There is an 
extensive scientific literature on composite indicators (see the list of references).  
This section presents to a non-technical reader the most important technical issues that need to be taken into 
account when building the composite indicator. 
Beyond the issue of the fat right tail that is already discussed in Section 3.1.1, another important point to be 
considered is the correlation structure between the indicators. There is a number of reasons why correlation should 
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be carefully taken into account when deciding on how to build a composite indicator. The most important ones are 
the following. 
 Correlation analysis helps understanding if indicators are grouped into pillars correctly. For instance, a very 
low correlation between indicators within the same pillar suggests that these indicators may not be 
capturing the same aspect.  
 Correlation analysis also helps assigning correct weights to the various indicators/pillars. In this respect it is 
common to distinguish between nominal weights, i.e. the weights assigned a priori to indicators/pillars by 
expert judgment, and effective weights, the real importance of the various indicators/pillars in the final 
composite indicator. The latter can be measured using statistical tools such as sensitivity analysis. It is not 
rare to have effective weights that differ substantially from nominal weights. For instance, the presence of 
high correlation between ratios in different pillars can enhance their importance in the composite indicators 
and thus can drive effective weights to be substantially different than the assigned nominal weights. 
Table 12 shows the correlation matrix estimated using the sample of data for large banks19 (the distinction between 
small and large banks will be clarified in Section 4 and subsequently where contributions are presented, as different 
treatments are applied to small and large banks). Data show the existence of a non-negligible positive correlation 
(0.44) between the two ratios (RWA/TA and CE/TA) included in pillar 1 (risk exposure). This fact, coupled with the 
opposite sign attributed to these indicators, reduces the effective importance of such pillar in the whole composite 
indicator. 
Important notes: 
1. JRC would thus suggest considering an aggregation without grouping into pillars, performed via geometric 
weighted average on the 5 indicators, should this positive correlation persist in the official data used for 
the calculation. 
2. Due to these technical issues, JRC believes that it is fundamental that additional indicators/pillar are 
statistically assessed before being included in the risk adjustment for (S)RF contribution. Including an 
additional single indicator may change the relative importance of the others and affect the statistical 
coherence of the whole composite indicator. JRC suggests that data on the additional indicators that the 
supervisory authority may include are collected yearly among all banks in order to perform statistical 
analyses on an extended dataset.  
3. JRC suggests performing a robust statistical assessment on the composite indicator based on a panel of data 
covering more years. These statistical checks could be performed yearly when new data will become 
available and additional/new indicators should be introduced.   
Table 12: Correlation matrix between the indicators currently used. Note that the correlation is a rank correlation 
(best practice in the assessment for composite indicator construction).  
 
Sign of 
indicator 
+ - 
- 
+ + 
 RWA/TA CE/TA Cap/RWA Loans/Dep Share IB+ + IB- 
RWA/TA + 1 0.44 -0.55 0.12 -0.30 
CE/TA - 0.44 1 0.26 0.15 -0.22 
Cap/RWA - -0.55 0.26 1 -0.04 0.09 
Loans/Dep + 0.12 0.15 -0.04 1 0.18 
Share IB+ + IB- + -0.30 -0.22 0.09 0.18 1 
 
 Formulas to determine risk-based contributions 
The contribution to the Fund to be paid by large banks should include a risk-based element, obtained aggregating 
indicators as described in the previous Section. Risk-based contributions could be determined according to some 
                                                          
19 According to DG MARKT definition adopted in the current exercise, big banks are those with base for contribution to (S)RF 
larger than 300 m€ or with total assets larger than 1 b€. 
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different formulas, depending on the way the base for contributions and the risk adjustment are combined. After 
examination by the JRC and presentation to the Commission Experts Group on Banking Payments and Insurance 
three models were retained as alternatives for the final exact mechanism for risk adjustment: 
1. A Multiplicative model which rescales the composite risk indicator into a given range (Model A - MA) 
2. A Multiplicative model using an exponent on risk to assign relative weights to the size-based and risk-based 
parts (Model O - MO) 
3. A hybrid model summing a purely size-based component and a risk-adjusted component (the latter based 
on a multiplicative formula) (Model H - MH). 
The next Sections focus on the main properties of these models. The following notation is adopted for all the models: 
 Target is the total annual target that should be collected, excluding the amount collected from small banks 
(lump sums, as detailed in Section 4). 
 Bi is the amount of the total liabilities, excluding own funds and covered deposits for bank i, (i.e. the so 
called BRRD base). 
 Ri: it is the risk correction for bank i, i.e. the composite indicator computed as detailed in the previous 
Section. 
 Pure flat contribution is the contribution which would be paid by each bank in the absence of a risk 
adjustment. This is given by the share of the BRRD base owned by the bank within the Euro area or within 
the non-participating MS, multiplied by the target: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
= 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑖
𝐵1 +⋯+𝐵𝑁
 
 
Share of the BRRD base of bank i 
in the banking system (€-area or MS 
not participating to the BU) 
 
where N is the number of banks in the Euro area or number of banks at national level for the non-
participating MS. 
In all of the following discussion, it should be noted that the contribution for any bank depends upon the risk 
and bases of all the others: as a pre-assigned total has to be divided between a set of institutions, what counts 
are exclusively relative size and risk. In other words, starting from a situation where the target is exactly reached, 
increasing/decreasing the riskiness for even only one bank would imply a change to its risk contribution which 
in turn would generate an overshooting/undershooting of the target. This would require the amount of the 
overshooting/undershooting to be divided between all other banks, proportionally to what they are already 
paying, and cause a variation of the contributions of all the banks which did not vary their absolute risk. This re-
adjustment to the target is given in all models by the so-called normalization terms, which are included in the 
denominators. 
 
3.2.1 Multiplicative – Model A 
In the first model the composite indicator is rescaled into a pre-defined range [Rmin, Rmax] which specifies the ideal 
maximum penalization and discount to be awarded to the most risky and least risky banks in the sample. This 
rescaled risk indicator will be labelled as ?̃?𝑖  and the transformation applied to the composite indicators obtained is: 
?̃?𝑖 = (𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛) ∗
𝐶𝐼𝑖 − min
𝑖
𝐶𝐼𝑖
max
𝑖
𝐶𝐼𝑖 − min
𝑖
𝐶𝐼𝑖
+ 𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛 
where 𝐶𝐼𝑖  is the value of the composite indicator for bank i obtained via formulas 4 and 5 above and the min/max 
are taken over all banks in the Euro area for MS participating to the Banking Union and over all banks in the national 
systems for the remaining MS. 
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The general expression to compute contributions ci that bank i would pay to the RF under the multiplicative model 
A is the following: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
∙ ?̃?𝑖
∑ (
𝐵𝑗
∑ 𝐵𝑘𝑘
∙ ?̃?𝑗)𝑗
  
where 
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
 is the “flat component”, or the share of the target that would be paid by each institution under a “pure 
flat” contribution based exclusively on the BRRD base unadjusted for risk. 20 
The denominator ∑ (
𝐵𝑗
∑ 𝐵𝑘𝑘
∙ ?̃?𝑗)𝑗   is the “normalization term” which again is identical for all banks within the Euro 
area or non-participating MS and assures that the target is met exactly. 
The range of variation of ?̃?𝑖, where the composite indicator is rescaled, could be set for instance to [0.8, 1.5]. This 
choice would imply that, before applying the normalization term to assure reaching the target, the highest risk bank 
would see its pure flat contribution increase by 50%, while the least risky bank would see its pure flat contribution 
decreased by 20%.  
One should note that, given necessity of renormalization to meet the pre-determined target, the final range of 
discounts and penalizations will not coincide with those implied by the initial rescaled range of the composite risk 
indicator. By way of example on Euro Area data (where indicators are discretized), rescaling Ri on [0.8, 1.5] yields a 
final range of ratios 0.604-1.133 (or an implied maximum discount of about 40% and maximum penalization of about 
13%). However, the ratio of the final maximal discount to the final maximal penalty will be the same as those 
imposed in the initial range: in other words:  
1.133
0.604
=
1.5
0.8
= 1.875. 
As a final remark, it should be noted that, given this property, the exact extremes of the range actually become 
unimportant, as only their ratio determines the final ratio of the maximum adjustments which are applied under the 
constraint of having to meet the target. In other words, in the above case, imposing an initial range of [0.8, 1.5] or 
of [1, 1.875] or of [0.6, 1.125] would always result in a final maximal discount of 40% and maximal penalty of 13% 
(i.e. the range of [0.604, 1.133] after renormalization). 
 
3.2.2 Multiplicative – Model O 
The general expression to compute contributions ci that bank i would pay to the (S)RF under the multiplicative model 
O is the following: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖
𝛽
∑ 𝐵𝑗 ∗ 𝑅𝑗
𝛽
𝑗
= 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖
𝛽
𝐵1 ∗ 𝑅1
𝛽
+ ⋯ + 𝐵𝑁 ∗ 𝑅𝑁
𝛽
 
where  is a parameter assigning a “weight” to the risk component vis-à-vis the size component. In theory, an 
exponent could be applied also to the size component. However, theoretical reasons suggest that an exponent of 1 
is the best choice for size.21 
                                                          
20 It should be noted that the two ∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗  terms in the numerator and denominator cancel out, so that calculating the contribution 
based on the share of the BRRD base or on the absolute BRRD base is indifferent. However, this method of presenting the 
indicator highlights that the risk factor multiplies the “pure flat” contribution by a risk factor and then re-normalizes the result in 
order to exactly reach the target. 
21 An exponent equal to 1 grants that given a certain relative increase in size of the institution its contribution will increase by the 
same relative amount, before the normalization to reach the target is applied. Moreover, empirical tests showed that an 
exponent different from one would make the whole indicator overtly sensitive to changes in both size and risk. The relative weight 
of risk vis-à-vis size is roughly given by the ratio of  to 1+ but this does not take into account the renormalization term. 
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The denominator is the “normalization term” which is identical for all banks within the Euro area or non-participating 
MS and ensures that the sum of the risk-based contributions will be exactly identical to the given target.22 
The exponent can be calibrated to produce the desired distribution of contributions between banks, based on 
their relative riskiness. Given that the target must be reached, similarly to the range of ?̃?𝑖 in MA, the exponent 
cannot be used to reach any desired distribution, or to reproduce a given target “penalization” or “discount” in 
absolute terms, but it can be calibrated to reproduce a desired ratio between the maximum penalization and the 
maximum discount. For instance, it cannot ensure that the riskiest banks will be penalized by, say, 50%, but it can 
be calibrated to ensure that if two banks have the same size and one has the maximum risk value, and the other the 
minimum, the risky one will pay roughly 50% more than the safe one after renormalization.  
The calibration needs to be performed via a numerical optimization procedure, the exact result of which will depend 
on the joint distribution of risk and size within the sample considered (e.g. Euro area banks or national banks in a 
non-participating MS). While an exponent of 0.4-0.5 seems able to reproduce a final distribution of outcomes similar 
to that obtained by using a [0.8, 1.5] range in MA, there is no theoretical guarantee that this could be equally valid 
across all MS and over time, especially for non-participating MS with a limited number of banks contributing to their 
fund. 
 
3.2.3 Hybrid formula - Model H 
The general expression to compute contributions ci that bank i would pay to the RF under the additive model is the 
following: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ∗ (𝛼 ∗
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
+ (1 − 𝛼) ∗
𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑖
𝛽
∑ 𝐵𝑗 ∗ 𝑅𝑗
𝛽
𝑗
) 
All the variables have the same meaning as above: 
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
 is the share of the “pure flat” contribution 
𝐵𝑖 𝑅𝑖
𝛽
∑ 𝐵𝑗 𝑅𝑗
𝛽
𝑗
 is a risk-adjustment component, which is based on the MO model. 23 
𝛼 is the weight assigned to the “pure flat” term, while (1 − 𝛼) is the weight assigned to the risk-adjusted term, 
which is based on both size and risk.24 In order to fulfil the constraint that all banks contributions ci must sum up to 
the target, 𝛼 must lie between 0 and 1. An  offset to 0.8 or 0.85 has been discussed in the Commission Expert 
Group on Banking Payment and Insurance. 
It should be noted that in this model the normalization term is included only in the risk adjustment term (i.e. the 
term after the 1-). This model has therefore two properties which set it aside from purely multiplicative models: 
1. Risk-based contributions will never be able to go below  times the pure flat contribution which would be 
paid in the absence of risk adjustment, so that the maximum discount vis-a-vis the pure flat contribution in 
                                                          
22 It should be noted that, when the exponent of the base is set to one, the absolute BRRD base 𝐵𝑖  could be substituted with 
the “flat component” 
𝐵𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
 and the results would be exactly the same. In this sense, the risk factor with its exponent can be seen 
as a modifier to the “pure flat” contribution, exactly like ?̃?𝑖 in model MA. 
23 A correction terms based on model MA is also possible, but this was seen to possess inferior properties as it requires an 
excessively large scale for the risk component in order to produce reasonable results. 
24 A purely additive model where the size component did not enter the risk adjustment was tested at the beginning of the process 
and excluded because of its property of penalizing excessively small banks due to lack of consideration of the size component 
when adjusting for risk. This risked generating risk-based contributions which were up to several times larger than the pure flat 
contribution for small banks. 
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this model is hard-wired to be (1 − 𝛼) (i.e. if  = 80%, then no bank can ever get a discount bigger than 
20% after normalization, even if contributions from all banks would need to be reduced in order to meet 
the target). Given that there is a constraint to reach a target, this will also introduce an implicit constraint 
to the maximum penalty which would be assigned to the most risky banks (i.e. if some low risk banks are 
already enjoying the maximum discount and a risky bank increases its risk, the surplus payment this 
generates cannot be attributed to the low risk bank which is already enjoying the maximum discount); 
2. Any overshooting or undershooting will therefore not be distributed between banks proportionally to what 
they are already paying, but will insist more on banks which are “far” from enjoying their maximum 
discount. This implies that, in case of a massive overshooting caused by the presence of some very risky 
banks, the less risky banks will be prevented from enjoying a large discount, and the risky banks will not be 
able to be penalized too much in order to allow the system to stay on target (i.e. : the reduction which 
cannot be attributed to the low risk banks enjoying maximal discounts will need to be re-distributed to the 
others, including the risky bank who generated the surplus by increasing their contributions, thereby 
mitigating the impact of their risk increase). On the upside, a massive shortfall caused by a widespread low 
riskiness of the largest banks in the system would in theory be somehow capped under this model. 
However, it has to be noted that since there is a rather strong positive association between size and risk, it 
does not seem likely that the largest banks would be able to enjoy the lowest risk adjustments. 
The exponent of the risk adjustment factor can be calibrated using a numerical procedure, as per model MO. 
However, the fact that only a limited part of the contribution is subject to risk adjustment will impose a trade-off 
between being able to reach the same ratios between the maximal penalty and discount and not making the model 
become very sensitive to changes in risk. In other words, in order for the risk-adjustment component to have a 
relatively large impact on contributions, an extremely high exponent would have to be chosen at the start of the 
collection period, potentially leading the model to being over-sensitive to changes in risk over time. Moreover, the 
fact that only part of the contribution is subject to renormalization makes MH potentially even more sensitive to 
changes in the joint distribution of risk vs. size.25 
3.2.4 Main properties of the models and comparison 
JRC would suggest the adoption of model MA based on the following observations: 
 MA can be calibrated just by setting limits of the rescaled risk range to coincide with maximal desired 
penalization and discount for risk adjustment. 
 MH and MO need to be calibrated by a numerical procedure and calibration differs depending or 
range/distribution of risk AND size; 
 In MA normalization will automatically shift this range but leave the ranking and the shares of contributions 
on the total untouched. It will also assure that the ratio between maximal discount and penalty after 
normalization will be identical to the ratio of the extremes of the range before normalization; 
 MA will therefore allow knowing final ratio of adjustments, even after calibration, just by knowing the max 
and min risk adjustments; 
 In MH normalization will alter relative position of risk-based contributions (generally by “compressing” 
relative position of top); 
 In MA and MO surpluses or shortfall due to a change in the riskiness of a single bank will be distributed 
across all banks which did not change their indicators proportionally to their pre-change contribution 
payments (i.e. all unchanged banks will see their contributions vary by an identical percentage); 
 In MH, “bottom” of range has a “hard” limit which is not affected by normalization, but “top” is also severely 
limited and either makes model “insensitive” to risk, or needs an extremely strong risk exponent in the risk 
adjusted component; 
                                                          
25 In “toy models” one could observe cases where the ideal exponent to reach a desired ratio between the maximal penalty and 
discount would change fourfold in response to a dramatic change in the joint distribution of risk and size (namely, an inversion 
of riskiness between the largest and smallest banks in the sample). While this is an extremely unlikely event in reality, nonetheless 
this behaviour was not observed in the calibration of MO. 
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 While the absence of a “hard limit” in MA and MO would allow a theoretical risk of allowing the largest 
banks to enjoy the lowest risk indicators and thus push smaller banks to pay a large share of the 
contributions, this seems unlikely given the distribution of the indicator (though it cannot be ruled out a-
priori). 
 
Table 13: Qualitative comparison of the characteristics of alternative models for the calculation of contributions  
  MA MO MH 
Ability to fix (or ease of calibration) a desired ratio of maximal 
penalty to maximal discount w.r.t. pure flat contribution 
++ + - 
Ability to fix (or ease of calibration) of minimal contribution w.r.t. 
pure flat contribution 
- - ++ 
Proportionality in distribution of surpluses and shortfalls due to 
variation of other banks’ characteristics 
++ ++ 0 
Maintenance of relative contributions and shares of contributions 
after application of normalization term 
++ ++ - 
Strength of implicit limits to setting maximal discount and penalty 
w.r.t. pure flat contribution 
0 - - - 
Maintenance of incentives to decrease riskiness for most risky banks - 0 0 
Risk of applying different risk based contributions to banks with 
similar size and risk profiles 
- 0 + 
Risk of non-well adapted calibration to different areas or over time 
periods 
0 - - 
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Figure 5: A toy example of the properties of the different models under changes to the “distribution” of BRRD 
bases and risks. 
 
 
  
LEGEND OF TABLES' COLUMNS
(a) Brrd base
(b) Risk Composite
(c) Risk Adjusted contribution, before normalization
(d) Ratio of top to bottom payer
(e) Risk adjusted contribution, after normalization
(f) Ratio of top to bottom payer
(g) Ratio of risk adjusted after normalization to pure flat fee
(h) Ratio of maximal penalty to maximal discount, after normalization
Changed values with respect to baseline (top left)
Exponents of MO, MH, calibrated to reproduce ratio of maximal penalty to maximal discount obtained in MA model with range 0.8-1.5
Model MA range 0.8 - 1.5 Model MA range 0.8 - 1.5
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Bank1 700 20 105 4.375 81.39535 4.375 1.162791 1.875 900 20 135 16.875 94.40559 16.875 1.048951 1.875
Bank2 300 10 24 18.60465 0.620155 100 10 8 5.594406 0.559441
Model MO Exp. 0.9 Model MO Exp. 0.9
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1037.59 4.354154 81.32291 4.354 1.161756 1.866 1334.042 16.79459 94.38032 16.795 1.04867 1.866
238.298 18.67709 0.62257 79.43282 5.619684 0.561968
Model MH alpha 0.8 Exp. 8 Model MH alpha 0.8 Exp. 8
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
3.6E+11 597.3333 75.96657 3.161 1.085237 1.355 4.61E+11 2304 91.99132 11.486 1.022126 1.276
6E+08 24.03343 0.801114 2E+08 8.008677 0.800868
Model MA 0.8 - 1.5 Model MA 0.8 - 1.5
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Bank1 700 10 56 1.244444 55.44554 1.244 0.792079 1.875 900 10 72 4.8 82.75862 4.8 0.91954 1.875
Bank2 300 20 45 44.55446 1.485149 100 20 15 17.24138 1.724138
Model MO Exp. 0.9 Model MO Exp. 0.9
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
556.03 1.250402 48.56847 1.172 0.793764 1.866 714.8954 4.822981 82.82666 4.823 0.920296 1.866
444.681 41.43863 1.481217 148.2269 17.17334 1.717334
Model MH alpha 0.8 Exp. 8 Model MH alpha 0.8 Exp. 2.3
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1.4E+09 109.7143 56.18065 1.282 0.802581 1.82 3663.472 1.856648 84.99879 5.6661 0.944431 1.588
1.5E+11 43.81935 1.460645 1973.165 15.00121 1.500121
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4. Analysis of banks’ contributions – focus on small banks 
This section and the following ones present numerical results on the contributions of banks to the SRF. This section 
focuses on small institutions, while Sections 5 and 6 deal with different aspects related to large institutions. 
A bank is considered as a small bank if it meets two cumulative conditions: BRRD base (defined as total liabilities 
excluding own funds and covered deposits) below 300 million € and Total Assets below 1 billion €. A special 
treatment consisting in a lump sum annual payment is applied to small banks in view of their lower need to access 
the resolution financing arrangements compared to that of large institutions. Before detailing how the lump sum 
system works, Table 14 presents some statistics on the set of small banks within each economic area. This table 
shows the number of small banks, the amount of their total assets and BRRD bases and their shares with respect to 
the whole dataset. According to these figures, in the euro area small banks represent 55% of the banks, 1.7% of total 
assets and 1% of the BRRD base. Nevertheless, MS are rather heterogeneous: small institutions can represent as 
much as 93% of the total banking system in Finland and as little as 7% in Ireland; in terms of total assets and BRRD 
base they can represent as much as 37% in Croatia and as little as around 0.1% in Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and United Kingdom.  
Table 14: Statistics on small banks, sample figures 
Economic 
area 
Number of banks Total Assets BRRD base 
All 
banks 
Small 
banks 
Small 
banks (as 
% of total 
number of 
banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Small banks  
(th €) 
Small 
banks 
(as % of TA 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Small banks 
(th €) 
Small banks 
(as % of 
BRRD base 
all banks) 
AT 668 575 86.1%  879,305,789   105,728,335  12.0%  610,421,541   34,978,834  5.7% 
BE 45 11 24.4%  935,583,114   3,465,139  0.4%  588,932,347   1,690,438  0.3% 
CY 10 1 10.0%  54,850,025   531,294  1.0%  26,162,767   270,127  1.0% 
DE 1740 859 49.4%  8,266,923,037   203,737,392  2.5%  6,159,144,464   107,629,466  1.7% 
EE 6 3 50.0%  12,797,090   510,163  4.0%  6,274,212   231,530  3.7% 
ES 62 15 24.2%  2,409,149,066   3,467,520  0.1%  1,529,801,692   1,359,232  0.1% 
FI 266 246 92.5%  486,844,150   35,094,280  7.2%  394,116,010   8,962,910  2.3% 
FR 195 75 38.5%  6,466,453,443   11,444,101  0.2%  5,265,822,355   6,499,658  0.1% 
GR 10 3 30.0%  316,886,598   750,742  0.2%  169,938,198   259,010  0.2% 
IE 31 2 6.5%  978,971,513   925,474  0.1%  833,190,116   535,585  0.1% 
IT 595 263 44.2%  3,162,595,451   56,974,526  1.8%  2,338,762,774   34,245,608  1.5% 
LT 7 3 42.9%  16,878,730   660,783  3.9%  9,559,361   377,353  3.9% 
LU 105 21 20.0%  634,960,991   5,016,354  0.8%  559,634,807   2,928,011  0.5% 
LV 19 7 36.8%  24,908,053   1,655,150  6.6%  16,221,678   1,079,816  6.7% 
MT 19 7 36.8%  27,510,463   588,009  2.1%  15,733,147   325,694  2.1% 
NL 48 8 16.7%  2,033,738,687   2,654,584  0.1%  1,488,773,348   946,954  0.1% 
PT 123 98 79.7%  442,544,164   15,134,910  3.4%  279,930,483   3,264,986  1.2% 
SI 17 4 23.5%  36,853,241   2,321,050  6.3%  19,125,053   604,395  3.2% 
SK 12 2 16.7%  50,806,559   849,048  1.7%  21,330,174   202,059  0.9% 
Euro area 3,978 2,203 55.4% 27,238,560,163 451,508,854 1.7% 20,332,874,525 206,391,668 1.0% 
BG 24 10 41.7% 39,270,243 3,933,947 10.0% 15,865,362 1,637,241 10.3% 
CZ 23 3 13.0% 166,882,156 1,240,178 0.7% 88,993,553 218,517 0.2% 
DK 70 38 54.3% 566,547,859 7,964,072 1.4% 377,124,381 2,995,186 0.8% 
HR 21 15 71.4% 7,012,864 2,563,948 36.6% 5,957,418 2,184,727 36.7% 
HU 12 5 41.7% 39,384,364 828,420 2.1% 26,148,415 445,561 1.7% 
PL 245 210 85.7% 289,793,612 11,329,352 3.9% 183,366,909 6,615,035 3.6% 
RO 25 8 32.0% 65,695,654 1,402,626 2.1% 33,293,416 628,494 1.9% 
SE 64 43 67.2% 836,497,962 14,341,859 1.7% 605,233,004 5,099,237 0.8% 
GB 177 62 35.0% 8,364,505,719 14,211,076 0.2% 7,008,941,282 9,165,757` 0.1% 
 
 Lump-sum system for small banks 
According to the lump sum system small banks are split into different buckets depending on the dimension of their 
BRRD base. A different fixed payment (the lump sum) is associated to each bucket.  
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Two alternative approaches for splitting small banks among buckets have been tested. The first one divides small 
banks into three buckets according to some thresholds set on the BRRD base and then it associates a fixed payment 
to each bucket, as described in Table 15; the second approach replicates this mechanism by increasing the number 
of buckets (to six) and the associated lump sums, as described in Table 16.  
Table 15: The three buckets system: thresholds and lump sums, th € 
Buckets  Lump sum 
BUCKET 1: BRRD base <= 100,000                     & TA <= 1,000,000 5 
BUCKET 2: 100.000 < BRRD base <= 200,000  & TA <= 1,000,000 10 
BUCKET 3: 200.000 < BRRD base <= 300,000  & TA <= 1,000,000 15 
 
Table 16: The six buckets system: thresholds and lump sums, th € 
Buckets  Lump sum 
BUCKET 1: BRRD base <= 50.000                       & TA <= 1,000,000 1 
BUCKET 2: 50.000 < BRRD base <= 100.000    & TA <= 1,000,000 2 
BUCKET 3: 100.000 < BRRD base <= 150.000  & TA <= 1,000,000 7 
BUCKET 4: 150.000 < BRRD base <= 200.000  & TA <= 1,000,000 15 
BUCKET 5: 200.000 < BRRD base <= 250.000  & TA <= 1,000,000 26 
BUCKET 6: 250.000 < BRRD base <= 300.000  & TA <= 1,000,000 50 
 
Moreover, a safeguard clause has been introduced and it imposes that all small banks pay the minimum between 
the lump sum associated to the bucket in which they fall and the flat fee. This avoids that a small bank could be 
penalized by the lump sum system. 
The basic flat contributions are compared with the lump sums (both 3 and 6-buckets) to assess the subsidy given to 
small banks under the special treatment. Figure 6 shows results for banks in the Euro area (the three buckets system 
is on the left-hand side and the six buckets system is on the right-hand side of the figure).  
Figure 6: 3-buckets system versus flat fee (left-hand side) and 6-buckets system versus flat fee (right-hand side), 
Euro area, th € 
3 BUCKETS 
 
6 BUCKETS 
 
 
The major concern that comes out when comparing a lump sum system (discrete) with the flat fee (continuous) is 
the existence of a cliff effect between the highest lump sum and the flat fee that a big bank right above the 300 
million € of BRRD base threshold would pay. By comparing the 3-buckets system with the 6-buckets, the second one 
seems to mitigate this effect. Indeed, increasing the number of buckets and, most importantly, increasing the level 
at which lump sums are set in an adequate progression over the BRRD base (but always well below the pure flat 
contribution) seems to effectively address the cliff effect. Table 17 reports the magnitude of the cliff effects (i.e. the 
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difference between the payment of the first bank outside the buckets and the last bank in the highest bucket) under 
the two systems.  
 
Table 17: Cliff effect under the 3-buckets system and the 6-buckets system, Euro area, th € 
System 
Last bucket 
Lump sum 
Payment of 
the smallest 
big bank 
Magnitude of 
the cliff effect 
3-buckets 15 87 72 
6-buckets 50 93 43 
 
Figure 7 below shows the 6-buckets system applied to Member States outside the Euro area.  
Figure 7: 6-buckets system versus flat fee for MS outside Euro area, th € 
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Additional remark: in Croatia the safeguard clause applies to 12 small banks out of 15. This explains why the two 
series almost overlap in the graph.  
 
4.1.1 Overall “subsidy” given to small banks under the 6-buckets approach 
Table 18 reports the overall contributions per MS paid by small banks under the flat fee and the 6-buckets system. 
Results are reported both in th € and as a share of the total annual target under the assumption that there would 
be only a flat fee and no risk fee. The last column presents the overall subsidy given to small banks when moving 
from the flat contribution to the 6-buckets systems. For example, -70% for the Euro area is the percentage variation 
in small banks’ aggregate contributions (i.e. (18,979 th €- 63,492 th €)/ 63,492 th €)). 
It is worth noting that the overall reduction in contributions of small banks is not the same across MS belonging to 
the Euro area and non-participating MS. In particular, for Croatia the lump sums are too high when compared to the 
estimated flat fees, which triggers the safeguard clause in 12 out of 15 cases, thereby yielding an insignificant 
aggregate reduction in the contributions of small banks.  
Table 18: Small banks annual contributions under different scenarios, sample estimates 
Economic 
area 
Small banks - Overall Flat fee  Small banks - Overall lump sums Reduction when 
moving from the 
flat fee to the lump 
sum  
th € 
as % of annual 
target(*) 
th € 
as % of annual 
target(*) 
AT  10,761  0.1720%  2,501  0.0400% -77% 
BE  520  0.0083%  170  0.0027% -67% 
CY  83  0.0013%  50  0.0008% -40% 
DE  33,110  0.5293%  10,532  0.1684% -68% 
EE  71  0.0011%  10  0.0002% -86% 
ES  418  0.0067%  118  0.0019% -72% 
FI  2,757  0.0441%  552  0.0088% -80% 
FR  1,999  0.0320%  648  0.0104% -68% 
GR  80  0.0013%  10  0.0002% -87% 
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Economic 
area 
Small banks - Overall Flat fee  Small banks - Overall lump sums Reduction when 
moving from the 
flat fee to the lump 
sum  
th € 
as % of annual 
target(*) 
th € 
as % of annual 
target(*) 
IE  165  0.0026%  100  0.0016% -39% 
IT  10,535  0.1684%  3,333  0.0533% -68% 
LT  116  0.0019%  24  0.0004% -79% 
LU  901  0.0144%  365  0.0058% -59% 
LV  332  0.0053%  121  0.0019% -64% 
MT  100  0.0016%  19  0.0003% -81% 
NL  291  0.0047%  110  0.0018% -62% 
PT  1,004  0.0161%  229  0.0037% -77% 
SI  186  0.0030%  69  0.0011% -63% 
SK  62  0.0010%  16  0.0003% -74% 
Euro area  63,492  1.0151%  18,979  0.3034% -70% 
BG 2,416 10.32% 199 0.85% -92% 
CZ 200 0.25% 10 0.01% -95% 
DK 1,445 0.79% 215 0.12% -85% 
HR 75 36.67% 74 36.21% -1% 
HU 200 1.70% 22 0.19% -89% 
PL 3,453 3.61% 465 0.49% -87% 
RO 610 1.89% 31 0.10% -95% 
SE 1,722 0.84% 435 0.21% -75% 
GB 1,398 0.13% 939 0.09% -33% 
Note: the annual target in each economic area (Eurozone, BG, CZ, DK, HR, HU, PL, RO, SE, GB) has been calculated as 
1% of overall covered deposits divided by 8.  
 
4.1.2 Additional burden for big banks under the 6-buckets approach 
Under the 6-buckets system every large bank would pay an additional burden to guarantee that the target will be 
reached despite the favourable treatment given to small institutions. This additional burden is summarized in Table 
19 (it should be noted that the percentage variation is the same for each bank within the same economic area).  
Table 19: Big banks annual additional payment (as a share of flat fee)  
Economic area 
Additional 
burden for 
each big bank 
Euro area + 0.72% 
BG + 10.56% 
CZ + 0.23% 
DK + 0.68% 
HR + 0.73% 
HU + 1.54% 
LT + 3.75% 
PL + 3.24% 
RO + 1.83% 
SE + 0.64% 
UK + 0.04% 
 
In conclusion, a minor additional burden for every big bank translates in a big overall reduction for small banks. 
Bulgaria stands out for the particularly high estimated additional burden that would be placed on the non-small 
banks when introducing the 6-buckets system. This is probably due to the fact that a sizeable estimated reduction 
in small banks contributions (-92%) is distributed among other big banks which are not very large (the biggest bank 
in Bulgaria has 6 billion € only of total assets).  
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5. Analysis of banks’ contributions – focus on large banks 
This section presents estimates of the risk-based contributions to the Resolution Fund due by large banks. Large 
banks are defined as banks with BRRD base greater than 300 million € or total assets greater than 1 billion €.26 
According to this definition and to the final database, Table 20 reports aggregate basic figures on the sample of large 
banks; Table 21 and Table 22 summarize the distribution of their total assets and BRRD bases for each economic 
area respectively. These distributions vary in a huge range. When considering TA, the ratio of the maximum to the 
minimum is about 5 thousand in the Euro area and in UK; when considering the BRRD base this ratio peaks at 22 
thousand in the Euro area and reaches as high as 160 thousand in Denmark. Also, distributions present very long 
right tails (the mean value is almost always above the median and for many economic areas it is even above the 
third quartile).  
Table 20: Basic figures on large banks, sample  
MS 
Number of banks Total Assets BRRD base 
All 
banks 
Large 
banks 
Large 
banks (as 
% of total 
number 
of banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Large banks  
(th €) 
Large 
banks 
(as % of TA 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Large banks 
(th €) 
Large 
banks (as % 
of BRRD 
base all 
banks) 
AT 668 93 13.9%  879,305,789   773,577,454  88.0%  610,421,541   575,442,707  94.3% 
BE 45 34 75.6%  935,583,114   932,117,975  99.6%  588,932,347   587,241,908  99.7% 
CY 10 9 90.0%  54,850,025   54,318,731  99.0%  26,162,767   25,892,640  99.0% 
DE 1740 881 50.6%  8,266,923,037   8,063,185,645  97.5%  6,159,144,464   6,051,514,997  98.3% 
EE 6 3 50.0%  12,797,090   12,286,927  96.0%  6,274,212   6,042,682  96.3% 
ES 62 47 75.8%  2,409,149,066   2,405,681,546  99.9%  1,529,801,692   1,528,442,460  99.9% 
FI 266 20 7.5%  486,844,150   451,749,870  92.8%  394,116,010   385,153,100  97.7% 
FR 195 120 61.5%  6,466,453,443   6,455,009,342  99.8%  5,265,822,355   5,259,322,697  99.9% 
GR 10 7 70.0%  316,886,598   316,135,856  99.8%  169,938,198   169,679,187  99.8% 
IE 31 29 93.5%  978,971,513   978,046,039  99.9%  833,190,116   832,654,531  99.9% 
IT 595 332 55.8%  3,162,595,451   3,105,620,925  98.2%  2,338,762,774   2,304,517,165  98.5% 
LT 7 4 57.1%  16,878,730   16,217,947  96.1%  9,559,361   9,182,009  96.1% 
LU 105 84 80.0%  634,960,991   629,944,637  99.2%  559,634,807   556,706,796  99.5% 
LV 19 12 63.2%  24,908,053   23,252,903  93.4%  16,221,678   15,141,862  93.3% 
MT 19 12 63.2%  27,510,463   26,922,453  97.9%  15,733,147   15,407,452  97.9% 
NL 48 40 83.3%  2,033,738,687   2,031,084,103  99.9%  1,488,773,348   1,487,826,394  99.9% 
PT 123 25 20.3%  442,544,164   427,409,253  96.6%  279,930,483   276,665,497  98.8% 
SI 17 13 76.5%  36,853,241   34,532,191  93.7%  19,125,053   18,520,658  96.8% 
SK 12 10 83.3%  50,806,559   49,957,511  98.3%  21,330,174   21,128,115  99.1% 
Euro area 3,978 1,775 44.6% 27,238,560,163 26,787,051,309 98.3% 20,332,874,525 20,126,482,856 99.0% 
BG 24 14 58% 39,270,243 35,336,297 90.0% 15,865,362 14,228,121 89.7% 
CZ 23 20 87% 166,882,156 165,641,978 99.3% 88,993,553 88,775,036 99.8% 
DK 70 32 46% 566,547,859 558,583,787 98.6% 377,124,381 374,129,194 99.2% 
HR 21 6 29% 7,012,864 4,448,917 63.4% 5,957,418 3,772,691 63.3% 
HU 12 7 58% 39,384,364 38,555,944 97.9% 26,148,415 25,702,854 98.3% 
PL 245 35 14% 289,793,612 278,464,260 96.1% 183,366,909 176,751,874 96.4% 
RO 25 17 68% 65,695,654 64,293,028 97.9% 33,293,416 32,664,921 98.1% 
SE 64 21 33% 836,497,962 822,156,103 98.3% 605,233,004 600,133,767 99.2% 
UK 177 115 65% 8,364,505,719 8,350,294,643 99.8% 7,008,941,282 6,999,775,525 99.9% 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Large banks are the banks not classified as small banks in Section 4. 
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Table 21: Summary statistics on large banks’ total assets per economic area, th € 
Economic area 
Total assets 
min 
25th 
percentile 
median 
75th 
percentile 
max average 
Euro area 348,859  929,290   1,794,794   5,089,564  1,723,459,000 15,091,297 
BG 700,736 1,191,853 2,357,157 3,223,111 6,472,304 2,524,021 
CZ 801,116 2,900,874 3,748,431 2,900,874 32,863,763 8,282,099 
DK 705,669 1,078,465 2,065,650 1,078,465 315,957,333 17,455,743 
HR 354,835 405,473 414,831 922,954 1,769,738 741,486 
HU 926,211 1,411,918 1,886,513 5,070,745 22,777,895 5,507,992 
PL 525,695 1,373,279 4,127,224 10,278,079 47,224,675 7,956,122 
RO 579,080 1,063,319 1,555,801 5,638,767 15,867,911 3,781,943 
SE 662,285 1,466,041 5,836,870 18,879,969 221,025,879 39,150,291 
UK 378,179 975,281 2,604,007 15,841,186 1,806,937,831 72,611,258 
 
Table 22: Summary statistics on large banks’ BRRD base per economic area, th € 
Economic area 
BRRD base 
min 
25th 
percentile 
median 
75th 
percentile 
max average 
Euro area 69,123  523,004   1,035,719   3,297,558  1,544,017,886 11,338,864 
BG 167,177 566,219 836,181 1,206,797 3,402,258 1,016,294 
CZ 126,099 526,637 2,023,126 5,194,030 18,173,681 4,438,752 
DK 1,389 49,273 207,383 641,058 224,180,702 5,387,491 
HR 309,278 340,800 362,474 764,983 1,505,738 628,782 
HU 663,753 1,163,058 1,227,024 3,665,505 14,154,952 3,671,836 
PL 320,746 1,018,877 2,802,704 6,653,889 29,341,269 5,050,054 
RO 319,134 667,613 918,643 2,344,824 7,947,751 1,921,466 
SE 124,999 184,945 3,900,477 15,528,332 169,752,726 28,577,798 
UK 307,052 629,950 1,794,660 12,387,981 1,573,086,254 60,867,613 
 
 Risk-based contributions 
Contributions to the Fund due by the large institutions are calculated taking into account their degree of risk 
according to the formula described in Section 3.2.1. To this aim, a composite risk indicator has been built to measure 
the riskiness of each large bank, following the steps detailed in Section 3.1. The list of individual risk indicators and 
the associated effective weights applied to build the composite indicator are reported in Table 23 below.  
Table 23: Balance sheet ratios and de-facto weights currently used in the current analysis 
Pillar / Indicator 
Effective 
weight 
Pillar: Risk exposure 62.5% 
Indicator: RWA over Total Assets 33.33% 
Indicator: Leverage ratio (Common equity over Total Assets) 33.33% 
Indicator: Capital ratio (Total regulatory capital over RWA) 33.33% 
Pillar: Stability and variety of the sources of funding and unencumbered 
highly liquid assets  
25% 
Indicator: Loan to Deposits (Customer loans over Customer deposits) 100% 
Pillar: Importance of an institution to the stability of the financial system or 
economy  
12.5% 
Indicator: Share of interbank loans and deposits to the system (Interbank loans 
+ interbank deposits)/sum(Interbank loans + interbank deposits) at EU level 
100% 
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The following differences should be noted with respect to the provisions detailed in the Delegated act:   
 In the first pillar, the capital ratio is calculated with total regulatory capital instead of common equity tier 
1. 
 The following indicators are not included: “own funds and eligible liabilities held by the institution in excess 
of MREL” in the first pillar, “net stable funding ratio” and “liquidity coverage ratio” in the second pillar (they 
are replaced by the ratio of customer loans to customer deposits).  
 The fourth pillar “Additional risk indicators to be determined by the resolution authority” is not included. 
An estimate of its potential impact on the contributions of large banks is presented in Section 6.  
Because of these discrepancies, the weights of risk pillars and indicators used in the present exercise are different 
with respect to what is stated in the article 7 of the Delegated act. In particular, weights of pillars have been rescaled 
so that they sum up to one (62.5%, 25% and 12.5% instead of 50%, 20% and 10%) and the same procedure has been 
applied to the weights of indicators within each pillar.  
Moreover, the following options have been chosen to get the final calculations:   
 The discretization procedure has been applied to tackle the long-tailed distributions of risk indicators. 
 Risk indicators within a pillar are aggregated through an arithmetic average while pillars are aggregated 
according to a geometric average.  
 The BRRD base includes the intra-group liabilities because the final available database does not set this item 
apart from the total liabilities (Section 7 details this issue).  
 The BRRD base includes derivative liabilities as they are reported by banks according to the accounting 
standard in use (Section 8 attempts to address this issue by providing an estimate of the potential impact 
of introducing a leverage ratio treatment for derivatives as under the Capital Requirements Regulation).  
 Risk-adjusted contributions are calculated according to Model A (see Section 3.2.1), with the risk indicator 
ranging between 0.8 and 1.5 (i.e. the ratio of the riskiest bank to the least risky one in terms of risk-
adjustment component is 1.875).  
 
5.1.1 Contributions by size 
Figure 8 plots the contributions of banks belonging to the Euro area (blue dots represent the flat fee and green dots 
the risk-based contribution) as a function of the BRRD base: each point in the plot represents a bank. A set of four 
zoomed in plots (from Figure 9 to Figure 12) depicts the payments to the fund due by specific categories of banks 
defined according the BRRD base size as it follows: 
 S (from the minimum BRRD base to 1 billion €); 
 M (from 1 billion € to 25 billion €); 
 L (from 25 billion € to 500 billion €); 
 XL (from 500 billion € to the maximum value) 
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Figure 8: Contributions to the Fund, Euro area, th € 
 
Figure 9: Zoom on S category (BRRD base up to 1 billion €), Euro area, th € 
 
Figure 9 above shows that the vast majority of the “smallest large banks” gets a downward risk-adjustment and thus 
they almost always pay less than the flat fee. Moreover, it seems that the lump sums are calibrated in a way that no 
risk-based contribution falls below the lump sums (no negative cliff-effect), i.e. no big bank pays less than any small 
bank.  
Figure 10 below zooms in the "M-size" banks. It seems that the risk-adjustment still reduces contributions, especially 
for the banks with a BRRD base up to 10 billion €.  
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Figure 10: Zoom on M category (BRRD base from 1 billion € up to 25 billion €), Euro area, th € 
 
The “L-size” banks are represented in Figure 11. The graph shows that the risk-adjustment generally works as a 
punishment for these banks, thus increasing the payment with respect the flat fee. Moreover, this result holds true 
for the biggest banks depicted in Figure 12.  
Figure 11: Zoom on L category (BRRD base from 25 billion € up to 500 billion €), Euro area, th € 
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Figure 12: Zoom on XL category (BRRD base from 500 billion € up to the maximum value), Euro area, th € 
 
To complement the information provided by the graphs above, Table 24 provides aggregate amounts of total assets, 
BRRD base and contributions for the different size categories. As for banks within the S category, though they 
represent the most populated group (49% of big banks), they cover a negligible part of total assets (3%) and of BRRD 
base (2%) and they also contribute for 2% only of the overall target. On the other hand, banks within the extra-large 
category represent a negligible share of the total number of big banks (they are only 4 out of 1775), but they account 
for around 20% of the total assets and BRRD base and collect around 22% of the target. 
Table 24: Aggregated figures for large banks within the Euro area 
  S M L XL 
Number of 
banks 
Number 867 786 118 4 
Share of total 21.8% 19.8% 3.0% 0.1% 
Total assets 
Amount th€ 884,576,739 5,479,897,665 15,669,077,667 4,753,499,238     
Share of total 3.2% 20.1% 57.5% 17.5% 
BRRD base 
Amount th€ 484,907,100 3,517,900,246 11,842,533,718 4,281,141,792 
Share of total 2.4% 17.3% 58.2% 21.1% 
Aggregated 
Contributions 
Amount th€ 130,284 1,016,041 3,749,625 1,340,088 
Share of total 2.08% 16.24% 59.95% 21.42% 
 
The following series of scatter plots (from Figure 13 to Figure 21) shows the contributions in non-participating MS.  
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Figure 13: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Bulgaria, th € 
 
Figure 14: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Czech Republic, th € 
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Figure 15: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Denmark, th € 
 
Figure 16: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Croatia, th € 
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Figure 17: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Hungary, th € 
 
Figure 18: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Poland, th € 
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Figure 19: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Romania, th € 
 
Figure 20: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), Sweden, th € 
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Figure 21: Flat fees (blue dots) and risk-based contributions (green dots), United Kingdom, th € 
 
Figure 22: United Kingdom - Zoom on small banks, th € 
 
 
It is worth noting that in the UK a negative cliff-effect occurs, as represented in Figure 22. In fact, the safeguard 
clause setting the flat fee as the maximum contribution for small banks applies to every bank in bucket number six. 
So, while the small banks in the 6th bucket pay the flat fee, the big banks right above the threshold pay less thanks 
to a favourable risk-adjustment.  
 
5.1.2 Example banks: how contributions work 
To better understand how the risk-adjustment works, Table 25 highlights, for each size category, some example 
banks in the Euro area with similar size and different risk indicator. Two banks similar in size would pay a very similar 
amount under the flat system while the risk-adjusted contribution can let banks pay less or more than the flat 
depending on their relative risk.   
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Table 25: Example banks with similar size and different risk profile, Euro area, th € 
Size 
category 
BRRD base  
th € 
Flat fee 
th € 
Riskiness 
Risk-based  
Contribution 
th € 
Variation 
(from the 
flat to the 
risk-based) 
S 
664,608 206  0.8247 128  -38% 
661,894 205  1.4469 224  +9% 
M 
14,727,777 4,563 1.1099 3,825 -16% 
15,178,094 4,703 1.4703 5,223 +11% 
L 
276,134,623 85,559 1.3002 84,025 -2% 
277,859,551 86,093 1.3703 89,105 +3% 
The following tables illustrate contributions for some selected banks to highlight that similar banks, both in terms of 
size and riskiness, pay a similar fee if they belong to the same economic area (Table 26), but failing this condition, 
contributions can significantly vary (Table 27).  
Table 26: Example banks with similar size and similar risk profile among different MS in the Euro area 
Size 
category 
Country 
BRRD base  
th € 
Riskiness 
Risk-based Contribution 
th € 
S 
Participating MS 1 603,715 1.1350 160 
Participating MS 2 605,105 1.1460 162 
M 
Participating MS 1 16,292,099 1.3665 5,210 
Participating MS 2 16,659,950 1.3307 5,188 
L 
Participating MS 1 330,310,614 1.3623  107,245  
Participating MS 2 336,207,073 1.3630  105,311 
 
Table 27: Example banks with similar size and similar risk profile belonging to different economic areas.  
Size 
category 
Country 
BRRD base 
th € 
Riskiness 
Risk-based Contribution 
th € 
S 
Participating MS 1  661,894  1.4469 224 
Non-participating  MS 1 665,007 1.4490 109 
Non-participating  MS 2 658,814 1.1569 261 
M 
Participating MS 1 22,923,458 1.4043 7,534 
Non-participating  MS 1 22,100,895 1.3163 3,304 
Non-participating  MS 2 22,224,291 1.4545 11,082 
L 
Participating MS 1 276,134,623 1.3002 84,025 
Non-participating  MS 1 261,623,219 1.5000 44,570 
Non-participating  MS 2 224,180,702 1.4738 113,267 
XL 
Participating MS 1 1,544,017,886 1.3556 489,843 
Non-participating  MS 1 1,573,086,254  1.3588 242,762 
 
5.1.3 Cumulative distribution of contributions by Total Assets 
In the following, graphs from Figure 23 to Figure 34 represent the cumulative distributions of overall contributions 
by total assets27 in each economic area. To help the reader better understand these figures, Table 28 reports for 
each decile of the Euro area distribution the corresponding number of banks whose cumulative total assets are 
                                                          
27 Banks are sorted in descending order (from largest to smallest) in terms of total assets. The biggest banks are on 
the left-hand side of the x-axis.  
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below the corresponding percentage. For example, the top 10 biggest banks in the Euro area represent around 30% 
of the overall total assets (third row in Table 28). 
Focusing on the Euro Area (Figure 23 and zoom in Figure 24) it can be noticed that the largest banks covering 85% 
of TA pay around 88% of the flat fees and 90% of the risk-based contributions.28  
Figure 23: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Euro area 
 
 
Figure 24: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Euro area – zoom around 85% of TA 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Banks corresponding to the cumulative 85% of total assets in the Euro area hold 11 billion € of total assets.  
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Table 28: Sample cumulative counts of banks by decile of total assets in the Euro area 
Cumulative 
share of TA 
Cumulative number 
of banks 
10% 1 
20% 4 
30% 10 
40% 17 
50% 29 
60% 49 
70% 86 
80% 169 
90% 431 
100% 3979 
 
Figure 25 adds a piece of information to the cumulative contributions plot: the blue and green lines are the 
cumulative curves already shown in Figure 23 (the y-axis is that on the left-hand side); the red bars show, for each 
bank, the variation in contributions when moving from the flat fee system to a the risk based one (the y-axis is the 
red one on the right-hand side). Results show that contributions tend to increase for the largest banks (i.e. in general 
there are upward variations on the left-hand side where the largest banks are), while they noticeably decrease for 
the small banks (on the very right-hand side of the graph). This result confirms that, as already pointed out in the 
scatter plots in Section 5.1.1, small banks tend to get a downward risk-adjustment while the largest banks tend to 
get an increase in contributions because of their riskiness. 
Figure 25: Cumulative contributions for Euro area banks and punctual percentage variation in contributions 
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Figure 26: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Bulgaria 
 
Figure 27: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Czech Republic 
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Figure 28: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Denmark 
 
Figure 29: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Croatia 
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Figure 30: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Hungary 
 
Figure 31: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Poland 
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Figure 32: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Romania 
 
Figure 33: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, Sweden 
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Figure 34: Cumulative distribution of contributions by TA, United Kingdom 
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6. Analysis of banks’ contributions – Introduction of the fourth pillar 
This section presents the potential impact on contributions of including the “additional risk factors to be specified 
by the resolution authority” pillar in the composite risk indicator. This pillar consists of 3 indicators (namely “trading 
activities and off-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, complexity and resolvability”, “membership in an 
Institutional Protection Scheme” and “extent of previous extraordinary public financial support” each associated to 
the weights 45%, 45% and 10% respectively) for which a specific discretional assessment of the resolution authority 
will be required.  
As quantitative data on this additional pillar are not available in the database, JRC implemented two scenarios by 
artificially assigning values to the indicator “Trading activities and off-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, 
complexity and resolvability” under the assumption that larger banks would tend to have higher values.29 
In both scenarios the maximum value of the indicator (i.e. 1,000)30 has been assigned to the "riskiest" banks in the 
EU. The criterion to select these banks is the following: the largest banks up to cover 65% of cumulative TA in each 
economic area, provided that the selected bank holds more than 30 billion € of TA. This approach is loosely in line 
with figures produced for the banking structural reform31 and it leads to select the number of banks shown in Table 
29. 
Table 29: Geographical distribution of the "riskiest" banks 
Economic 
Area 
Number of selected 
"riskiest" banks 
Euro Area 64 
CZ 2 
DK 1 
GB 5 
PL 2 
SE 2 
TOTAL 76 
The other banks have been assigned values chosen a priori: in Scenario 1 all the other banks are attributed the 
average value of all the other indicators; in Scenario 2 all the remaining institutions are set to the minimum value. 
This second scenario can be considered as an extreme scenario and thus it might help in assessing the maximum 
potential effect that in principle could be associated with the additional fourth pillar.  
JRC would like to stress that, as data for the fourth pillar have been created ad hoc, results should be carefully taken 
as, once data on the additional indicators would become available to the resolution authority, results might change. 
The list of indicators and relative weights is described in Table 30 below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 “Membership in an Institutional Protection Scheme” and “Extent of previous extraordinary public financial support” indicators 
cannot be modelled as data are missing for the vast majority of the banks and no information is available a priori about the 
characteristics of an entity that is member of an IPS or that received extraordinary public support.  
30 It is worth noting that this indicator has (+1) sign and thus it is transformed in step 2 when building the composite indicator, as 
detailed in Section 3.1.2.  
31 See Annex A8 of the Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU Credit Institutions 
and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council on reporting and transparency of securities financing 
transactions (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0030&from=EN)  
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Table 30: Balance sheet ratios and de-facto weights used when introducing the “additional risk factors” pillar  
Pillar / Indicator 
Effective 
weight 
Pillar: Risk exposure 50% 
Indicator: RWA over Total Assets 33.33% 
Indicator: Leverage ratio (Common equity over Total Assets) 33.33% 
Indicator: Capital ratio (Total regulatory capital over RWA) 33.33% 
Pillar: Stability and variety of the sources of funding and unencumbered 
highly liquid assets  
20% 
Indicator: Loan to Deposits (Customer loans over Customer deposits) 100% 
Pillar: Importance of an institution to the stability of the financial system or 
economy  
10% 
Indicator: Share of interbank loans and deposits to the system (Interbank loans 
+ interbank deposits)/sum(Interbank loans + interbank deposits) at EU level 
100% 
Pillar: Additional risk factors to be specified by the resolution authority 
based on the remaining elements covered by Article 103(7) of the BRRD.  
20% 
Indicator: Trading activities and off-balance sheet exposures, derivatives, 
complexity and resolvability 
100% 
The 76 riskiest banks in the EU account for a very large part of the total population in most of the economic areas 
including these selected banks (Euro Area, DK, GB and SE, where they represent more than 50% of TA and of BRRD 
base), while they are slightly less representative in CZ and PL. Further details are reported in Table 31. 
Table 31: Statistics on the “riskiest” banks 
Economic area 
Aggregated TA Aggregated BRRD base 
th € 
as % of overall 
TA in the 
economic area 
th € 
as % of overall 
BRRD bases in 
the economic 
area 
Euro Area 17,680,628,641 64.91% 13,975,406,661 68.73% 
CZ 65,200,852 39.07% 31,507,056 35.40% 
DK 315,957,333 55.77% 224,180,702 59.44% 
GB 5,366,351,945 64.16% 4,544,375,612 64.84% 
PL 83,504,251 28.82% 51,662,896 28.17% 
SE 422,000,706 50.45% 318,640,260 52.65% 
 
 Scenario 1: maximum-average 
Table 32 shows some statistics on the distribution of the percentage variation in contributions for the riskiest banks 
when introducing pillar 4. Results show that, on average, banks contributions increase from few percentage points 
(DK) to more than 20% (PL). 
Table 32: Statistics on the percentage variations in contributions of the "riskiest" banks when introducing pillar 4. 
  
Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions 
Euro Area CZ DK GB PL SE 
Average 2.4% 7.7% 1.1% 3.2% 21.8% 8.3% 
Median 1.8% 7.7% 1.1% 3.5% 21.8% 8.3% 
min -3.8% 6.9% 1.1% 0.8% 13.3% 3.0% 
max 23.5% 8.6% 1.1% 4.8% 30.4% 13.6% 
 
It is worth noting that in the Euro Area there are few banks among the selected “riskiest” ones for which their 
contributions decrease (i.e. the minimum variation is a negative number), though their composite indicator 
increases. This happens because of the following: 
 although the absolute risk (expressed via the risk indicator) increases, as expected, for all the selected 
banks, the final risk contribution depends upon the relative share of risk; 
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 some of these banks significantly increase their absolute risk, while others do so to a smaller extent. When 
computing the risk contributions, which reflect the relative riskiness of each bank, the former will face a 
sizeable increase in their contributions, while the latter will face a moderate increase in their contributions 
and in some cases they might also benefit from a reduction in their contributions. 
In order to provide some additional statistics on this characteristic, Table 33 shows the percentage range of variation 
of the absolute risk indicator, the rescaled risk indicator and the final risk contributions for the selected banks in the 
Euro area facing an increase in their contributions and for those facing a reduction. The figures demonstrate that 
those benefiting from a reduction are those facing a slight increase in the risk indicator (in the range 2% - 11%), with 
respect to the other group (from 12% to 113%). 
Table 33: Percentage ranges of variations for Euro area selected banks increasing and reducing their risk-based 
contributions  
 
Range of % variation 
in the absolute CI 
Range of % variation 
in the CI rescaled 
over [0.8-1.5] 
Range of % variation 
in risk contributions 
Banks increasing 
contributions 
[12%  113%] [5%  30%] [0.1%  24%] 
Banks reducing 
contributions 
[2%  11%] [1%  5%] [-4%  -0.3%] 
 
Artificially increasing the pillar for selected banks also has an impact on the remaining big banks: all those banks 
benefit from a reduction in their contributions (ranging on average from -1% to around - 10%) when moving from 
three to four pillars. Selected statistics on this reduction can be found in Table 34. 
 
Table 34: Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions of the "non-riskiest" big banks when introducing 
pillar 4 
  
Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions 
Euro Area CZ DK GB PL SE 
Average -5.32% -4.38% -1.11% -5.85% -7.90% -9.58% 
Median -5.23% -4.20% -1.00% -5.75% -7.87% -9.67% 
min -7.43% -7.66% -2.55% -7.50% -8.60% -11.06% 
max -4.73% -1.58% -0.41% -5.05% -7.04% -8.21% 
 
Figure 35 compares the flat contribution (blue dots), the risk-adjusted contribution based upon a 3-pillars indicator 
(green dots) and the risk-adjusted contribution including pillar 4 (red dots) for banks in the Euro area. The first graph 
in Figure 35 represents the overall sample, while the following graphs are zoomed in graphs for the selected size 
categories as presented in Section 5. Moreover, Figure 36 to Figure 41 show cumulative contributions based on a 4-
pillars indicator (green dots) for all economic areas the selected banks belong to. Results are compared with the 
cumulative flat contributions (blue dots). 
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Figure 35: Flat fee (blue dots), risk-adjusted contribution based upon a 3-pillars indicator (green dots) and risk-
adjusted contribution based upon a 4-pillars indicator (red dots), Euro area, th € 
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Figure 36: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), Euro area  
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Figure 37: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), CZ 
 
Figure 38: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), DK 
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Figure 39: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), GB 
 
Figure 40: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), PL 
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Figure 41: Cumulative risk-adjusted contributions based upon a 4-pillars indicator (green dots) and the cumulative 
flat fee (blue dots), SE 
 
 Scenario 2: maximum-minimum 
According to this alternative modelling of pillar 4, the “riskiest” banks get the maximum value (1,000) while the 
others get the minimum (1). Table 35 shows some statistics on the percentage variation in contributions when 
introducing pillar 4. On average, banks contributions increase by 3.2% in the Euro area. On the other hand, the “non-
riskiest” banks reduce their contributions by around 8% in the Euro area (see Table 36 below).  
Table 35: Summary statistics on the percentage variation in contributions of the "riskiest" banks when moving from 
a 3-pillars indicator to a 4-pillars one – Scenario 2 
  
Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions 
Euro Area CZ DK GB PL SE 
Average 3.2% 10.0% 1.9% 4.0% 25.1% 9.7% 
Median 2.6% 10.0% 1.9% 4.4% 25.1% 9.7% 
min -4.0% 9.1% 1.9% 1.7% 16.2% 4.2% 
max 24.6% 10.9% 1.9% 5.7% 34.0% 15.2% 
 
Table 36: Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions of the "non-riskiest" big banks when moving from a 
3-pillars indicator to a 4-pillars one – Scenario 2 
  
Statistics on the percentage variation in contributions 
Euro Area CZ DK GB PL SE 
Average -7.9% -5.6% -3.2% -8.1% -8.9% -10.5% 
Median -8.1% -6.0% -3.8% -8.5% -9.3% -10.8% 
min -8.2% -6.8% -4.2% -8.6% -9.7% -11.7% 
max -4.6% 0.5% 0.1% -5.1% -7.1% -7.6% 
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7. Proxying intragroup liabilities in European countries using interbank data  
As there is a need to assess the potential impact of intra-group liabilities in the calculation of the BRRD base, JRC has 
been asked to prepare some summary statistics on the distribution of interbank deposits as an upper bound proxy 
for intra-group liabilities.32 While as a proxy interbank deposits almost surely provide a large over-estimation of intra-
group liabilities, they should be much correlated to actual values (i.e. countries with much higher value of interbank 
deposits should also be those with high levels of intra-group linkages). 
Interbank liabilities are compared to the BRRD base (defined as Total Assets less Total Regulatory Capital and 
Covered Deposits, where Total Regulatory Capital is used as a proxy for total own funds33) and to Total Assets. 
These ratios are calculated for all banks in the final database as of Monday August 4 2014 and results are presented 
in terms of summary statistics of the resulting distributions of ratios over countries and Euro/Non Euro member 
states. 
“Small banks” (BRRD base less than 300 million €) are excluded from the sample before running the calculations. 
These banks are excluded as they are a very large number and are often not active in the interbank market (with 
some exceptions in some countries) so that including them would lead to a biased estimate of the mean and median, 
which would not be representative of the typical values of the banks which do participate in interbank/intra-group 
exchange activities. 
An alternative estimation methodology based on aggregate statistics from BIS and ECB is presented in the last 
section. 
 Proxying intragroup via the distribution of micro-level interbank data: results in terms of 
BRRD base 
The following graphs and tables present results in terms of BRRD base (defined as Total Assets less Own funds and 
Covered Deposits). 
Figure 42 is a box plot of the ratio of interbank liabilities to BRRD base for each country, grouped by its membership 
in Euro area. In the graph, the lower and upper limits of the box identify the 1st and 3rd quartile (one fourth of all 
banks have a value of the ratio which is lower than the 1st quartile, and one quarter of all banks have a value of the 
ratio which is higher than the 3rd quartile), the line in the box denotes the median (the value which splits the sample 
in two identical parts: half of the banks have a value of the ratio which is lower than the median, and half of the 
banks have a value which is higher), and the limits of the lower and upper whiskers denote the lowest and highest 
points which can be considered “normal” given the shape of the distribution.34 All individual points outside the 
whiskers are outliers: actual points which are “unexpected” given the shape of the rest of the distribution for that 
particular country. The biggest is the distance between the extremes of the box, the more spread-out is the 
distribution and the least the median and the mean can be considered “representative” of all other banks within the 
country which are not considered “outliers” (i.e. represented as individual points). 
 
                                                          
32 Though not all intra-group liabilities take the form of interbank deposits, these should be the most common form. 
33 Own funds are not directly available for most banks in the sample. Total Regulatory Capital and own capital are seen to be 
almost coincident in the sub-sample of the JRC sample for which both variables are available. 
34 This depends on the assumptions on the general shapes of statistical distributions employed to assess it. Here we use the 
classical Tukey definition of the box plot: the end points of the whiskers coincide with the lowest and highest actual points which 
fall within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range from the 1st and 3rd quartiles. The inter-quartile range being the distance between 
the 1st and the 3rd quartile. 
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Figure 42: Box plot of interbank deposits over BRRD base, excluding "small banks" (BRRD base<300m €) 
 
How to read the box-plot, an example: in BE about a quarter of all banks have a ratio of Interbank liabilities to BRRD 
which is lower than roughly 5% (3.47%, see Table 37); half of all banks in the sample have a ratio which is lower than 
about 10% and about half of the banks have a ratio which is above it; about a quarter of all banks have a ratio which 
is above about 30% (i.e. three quarters of all banks lie below this value); the bank with the highest value which is “not 
unexpected” given the general shape of BE distribution has a ratio of about 65%, and there are no banks with higher 
values; the bank with the lowest value has a value of about zero, and there are no banks with a lower value. 
Table 37 contains summary statistics for the interbank deposits to BRRD base ratio for all Euro area countries. Values 
are expressed as fractions (i.e. 0.1 corresponds to a 10% ratio). The table reports the average, the standard deviation 
(a measure of the “spread” of the distribution: the higher this value the less representative of the whole distribution 
the mean can be considered35) as well as four key measures of the boxplot graph shown above: the first quartile, 
the median, the third quartile and the interquartile range (i.e. the difference between the third and first quartiles, 
another measure of the spread of the distribution). The table also reports the minimum and maximum value for 
each country. Table 38 reports the same information for non-Euro area MS. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Values of the same magnitude of the mean roughly imply that almost 20% of all banks would have a value at 
least double than the mean itself. This under the assumption that the distribution has a Normal Distribution (i.e. 
Gaussian) shape. 
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Table 37: Summary statistics for interbank deposits over BRRD base, excluding "small banks" (BRRD<300m €). Euro 
area 
Country Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
1st 
quartile 
Median 
3rd 
quartile 
Interquartile 
range 
Min Max 
AT 36.31% 22.94% 19.54% 35.09% 50.85% 31.31% 0.52% 98.37% 
BE 18.16% 17.02% 3.47% 12.24% 28.64% 25.17% 0.01% 63.30% 
CY 24.17% 35.63% 0.00% 3.68% 67.72% 67.72% 0.00% 83.30% 
DE 28.26% 15.41% 18.25% 26.73% 35.99% 17.74% 0.00% 94.67% 
EE 27.64% 11.48% 18.77% 23.54% 40.60% 21.83% 18.77% 40.60% 
ES 29.88% 30.95% 5.65% 16.99% 53.89% 48.25% 1.74E-06 97.85% 
FI 3.95% 6.62% 0.01% 0.12% 5.47% 5.46% 1.61E-06 23.21% 
FR 24.24% 24.32% 8.81% 14.07% 34.16% 25.36% 7.46E-06 97.91% 
GR 12.25% 11.21% 1.88% 10.48% 22.12% 20.25% 0.27% 31.19% 
IE 35.93% 31.02% 8.77% 25.24% 59.34% 50.56% 0.03% 95.76% 
IT 23.30% 16.25% 13.45% 20.05% 28.09% 14.63% 0.20% 92.86% 
LT 14.21% 21.24% 1.33% 5.19% 27.10% 25.77% 0.82% 45.66% 
LU 28.11% 27.02% 6.23% 17.34% 49.37% 43.14% 0.00% 92.07% 
LV 17.64% 21.41% 1.24% 7.62% 33.45% 32.21% 0.64% 57.34% 
MT 42.20% 36.62% 6.99% 43.98% 75.39% 68.40% 5.81% 99.59% 
NL 23.84% 30.86% 1.23% 9.08% 28.93% 27.70% 0.00% 96.26% 
PT 36.55% 31.15% 9.95% 29.56% 56.41% 46.45% 1.79% 97.41% 
SI 32.93% 13.61% 27.05% 28.96% 34.96% 7.91% 18.68% 68.15% 
SK 6.92% 7.02% 1.63% 3.94% 11.03% 9.40% 0.00% 21.20% 
Total 27.05% 19.75% 13.66% 23.51% 35.53% 21.87% 0.00% 99.59% 
How to read the table, an example: in AT the average interbank liabilities over total assets is 36.3%; the distribution 
is relatively spread out. As with the boxplot: 25% of AT banks have a value of the ratio below roughly 19%, half of all 
banks have a value below 35% and three quarters of the banks have a value below 50.8%. The interquartile range is 
equal to 31%. The minimum value for all banks which are not “small” for our purposes (i.e with a BRRD base above 
300 m €) is almost zero, while the biggest observed value is around 98%. 
Table 38: Summary statistics for interbank deposits over BRRD base, excluding "small banks" (BRRD<300m €). Non-
Euro area 
Country mean 
standard 
deviation 
1st 
quartile 
median 
3rd 
quartile 
Interquartile 
range 
min Max 
BG 20.70% 15.63% 9.52% 18.71% 35.35% 25.83% 0.20% 49.08% 
CZ 9.92% 10.53% 1.13% 6.49% 16.12% 14.99% 0.00% 39.16% 
DK 12.94% 10.90% 4.87% 8.94% 19.35% 14.48% 0.62% 41.20% 
GB 18.93% 23.40% 1.06% 7.24% 32.64% 31.58% 0.00% 94.09% 
HR 8.25% 13.57% 0.33% 2.93% 8.11% 7.78% 0.01% 35.17% 
HU 50.70% 28.44% 20.04% 54.46% 70.88% 50.84% 11.41% 89.13% 
PL 13.84% 21.94% 0.72% 2.21% 21.68% 20.96% 0.00% 74.06% 
RO 39.25% 24.50% 12.89% 42.10% 59.84% 46.95% 2.43% 74.25% 
SE 21.70% 27.29% 2.23% 13.66% 23.56% 21.33% 0.25% 85.44% 
Total 19.11% 22.62% 1.85% 8.75% 29.32% 27.47% 0.00% 94.09% 
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Figure 43 offers a visual summary of the average values from the table above, for Euro area and non-Euro area 
countries. 
 
Figure 43: Average by country for interbank deposits over BRRD base, excluding small banks 
 
Figure 44 shows a histogram for the distribution of the value of the interbank deposits to total assets for the Euro 
area and non-Euro area. The height of each bar represents the share of all banks in each area possessing a value of 
the ratio comprised between those falling at the hedges of each bar. 
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Figure 44: Histogram of distribution of values of interbank deposits over BRRD base, excluding “small” banks, for 
Euro area and non-Euro area 
 
How to read the histogram, an example: in the Euro area roughly 8% of all banks have a value of the interbank 
deposits to total assets ratio which is between roughly 22% and 25%, and another 7% of all banks have a value of the 
ratio between 25% and roughly 28%. About 1% of all banks have a value of the ratio roughly between 75% and 81%. 
Finally, Figure 45 illustrates the relationship between the interbank deposits to total assets ratio, and the size of 
institutions in terms of total assets. The horizontal axis reports total assets in thousands of Euro (i.e. a value of 5 
followed by 8 zeros corresponds to 500 bn €, the biggest bank has total assets of roughly 1.5 tn €). From this graph 
it is possible to see that largest banks tend to have values of the ratio of interbank deposits over BRRD base which 
are relatively lower than the mass of other banks, but which can be non-negligible (i.e. about 25% for banks in the 
Euro area) 
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Figure 45: Scatterplot of values of interbank deposits over BRRD base vs TA, excluding “small” banks, for Euro area 
and non-Euro area 
 
A detail of the same data is provided in Figure 46, with a spike graph (i.e. a scatterplot with drop lines) of the same 
relationship, on a country-by-country basis for euro area countries. 
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Figure 46: Spike graph (scatterplot with drop lines) of values of Total Assets vs BRRD base, on a country by country 
basis, for countries in Euro area (boxes which are apparently blank are due to use a constant scale across countries). 
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 Estimating Intragroup Liabilities by means of BIS and ECB statistics: results in terms of 
BRRD base 
Intra-group liabilities can also be estimated as a share of interbank deposits by using some ratios from BIS and ECB 
statistics on interbank to intra-group deposits.36 
In its international banking statistics37, BIS provides a breakdown of international liabilities to foreign banks into 
liabilities to all foreign banks and liabilities to related foreign offices for 13 European countries (AT, BE, CY, DE, ES, 
FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT). 
In its MFI statistics,38 ECB provide data on the amounts of deposit liabilities towards other MFIs for each Euro area 
country, breaking it down into liabilities towards Euro area MFIs, MFIs within the European Union but outside Euro 
area, MFIs in the rest of the world. 
Ignoring the possibly major complication of the different statistical populations involved in the two exercises (credit 
institutions in the BIS exercise, MFIs including money market funds in the ECB exercise) it is therefore possible to 
obtain an estimate of intragroup interbank liabilities by following these steps: 
1. Estimate the total interbank for a country’s banks by summing deposit liabilities of its MFIs to all MFIs within 
the Euro area, other EU MS and other foreign countries; 
2. Estimate the share of foreign interbank on this total by comparing it to international interbank liabilities 
obtained from BIS statistic; 
3. Estimate the share of intragroup on foreign interbank deposits by comparing BIS data on total foreign interbank 
and intragroup foreign interbank; 
4. Obtain an estimate of the share of intragroup on domestic interbank by applying a “correction factor” to the 
estimate for the share of intra-group on foreign interbank obtained above. In this case the correction is 70%, 
based on the observation that domestic money market transactions are probably more likely to be conducted 
on the open IB market, while foreign transactions are relatively more likely to be conducted with a related office; 
5. Finally obtain the share of intragroup liabilities on interbank liabilities as the (weighted) average of the ratios 
obtained in points 3 and 4. 
Table 39 below shows the ratio of intra-group liabilities to BRRD base by country. For each Member State, this is 
obtained by multiplying the ratio of intragroup liabilities to interbank liabilities as per step 5 above to the ratio of 
interbank liabilities to total assets obtained from the final database. While it is not possible to obtain estimates for 
the range of variation of these estimates based on the data available, variation for interbank loans data estimated 
above could be a considered a proxy. 
Based on a similar reasoning, the overall median of the mean could be a good proxy of the impact at Euro area level 
(based on comparisons of the median of the means and of the total Euro area level mean on interbank data used in 
the previous section) 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 All data is sourced as of Q1 2014. BIS data is converted from USD to EUR at the exchange rate of 1.33 USD/EUR (Source: AMECO, 
end 2013 data point). 
37 http://www.bis.org/statistics/about_banking_stats.htm as of 5 September 2014. 
38 Statistics for credit institutions balance sheets do not provide the necessary breakdowns, thus leaving MFI statistics as the only 
possible choice:  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/index.en.html as of 5 September 2014. 
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Table 39: Ratio of intra-group liabilities to BRRD by country. 
Country 
Average 
intragroup as 
share of foreign 
IB 
Share of foreign 
IB 
Average 
intragroup as 
share of BRRD 
base 
AT 9.4% 32.7% 3.4% 
BE 44.2% 94.1% 8.0% 
CY 14.1% 3.6% 3.4% 
DE 56.7% 74.5% 16.0% 
ES 33.3% 58.9% 10.0% 
FI 13.8% 4.0% 0.5% 
FR 52.6% 61.8% 12.8% 
GR 25.5% 52.9% 3.1% 
IE 53.8% 33.1% 19.3% 
IT 38.0% 37.4% 8.9% 
LU 12.4% 5.1% 3.5% 
NL* 63.4% 94.1% 14.5% 
PT 26.0% 46.5% 9.5% 
Overall median     8.9% 
Note *: for NL, the share of foreign IB would result larger than 100%. This estimate 
is therefore substituted with the second highest estimated value in the sample 
before proceeding with the calculations. 
Also these estimates make apparent that there could be large variations between countries, which could be further 
amplified by individual bank level variation which cannot be captured in the current analysis. 
 Conclusions 
Based on the evidence presented above the main conclusions which can be taken are that, although using interbank 
loans as a proxy for intra-group liabilities is probably a rather large over-estimation, there could be cases where 
these could represent a non-negligible amount. Moreover, the distribution of these impacts would not be even 
between countries, with some which could be affected sensibly more than others. An alternative methodology based 
on ECB and BIS data, also points to the possibility of large between-country variations. 
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 Additional results in terms of Total Assets 
This section reproduces all graphs and tables reported above as ratio of interbank loans over TA. 
Figure 47: Box plot of interbank deposits over TA, excluding "small banks" 
 
 
Table 40: Summary statistics for interbank deposits over TA, excluding "small banks" Euro area. 
Country mean 
standard 
deviation 
1st quartile median 3rd quartile 
Interquartile 
range 
min Max 
AT 23.80% 18.94% 10.61% 19.53% 29.71% 19.09% 0.08% 94.83% 
BE 10.49% 9.41% 1.88% 8.18% 16.09% 14.21% 0.01% 34.17% 
CY 10.77% 15.83% 0.00% 1.76% 28.97% 28.97% 0.00% 37.89% 
DE 16.99% 12.20% 9.56% 14.66% 21.02% 11.46% 0.00% 88.79% 
EE 17.43% 12.59% 8.96% 11.43% 31.89% 22.94% 8.96% 31.89% 
ES 19.85% 22.89% 2.97% 9.48% 35.73% 32.76% 1.05E-06 86.67% 
FI 2.78% 4.84% 0.00% 0.04% 3.25% 3.25% 3.99E-07 14.30% 
FR 17.97% 21.89% 4.87% 8.55% 25.91% 21.04% 6.73E-06 95.89% 
GR 6.44% 6.09% 0.77% 5.94% 11.08% 10.31% 0.10% 17.28% 
IE 28.85% 27.15% 6.50% 17.97% 52.19% 45.69% 0.03% 82.48% 
IT 16.36% 13.66% 8.57% 12.80% 19.20% 10.63% 0.13% 88.17% 
LT 8.02% 12.50% 1.04% 2.35% 15.00% 13.96% 0.69% 26.69% 
LU 25.10% 24.63% 5.89% 15.21% 38.98% 33.09% 0.00% 83.39% 
LV 12.27% 15.62% 0.86% 4.50% 24.07% 23.20% 0.49% 39.92% 
MT 29.37% 25.59% 4.71% 35.35% 42.69% 37.98% 3.61% 78.18% 
NL 18.48% 27.47% 0.80% 5.02% 19.04% 18.24% 0.00% 89.83% 
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Country mean 
standard 
deviation 
1st quartile median 3rd quartile 
Interquartile 
range 
min Max 
PT 29.96% 29.71% 6.14% 15.99% 48.67% 42.53% 0.63% 88.94% 
SI 20.33% 12.97% 11.25% 17.22% 24.22% 12.97% 7.92% 50.73% 
SK 2.53% 2.29% 0.82% 1.89% 3.91% 3.09% 0.00% 6.93% 
Total 17.81% 16.36% 7.78% 13.67% 21.94% 14.16% 0.00% 95.89% 
 
Table 41: Summary statistics for interbank deposits over TA, excluding "small banks", non-Euro area. 
Country mean 
standard 
deviation 
1st 
quartile 
median 
3rd 
quartile 
Interquartile 
range 
min Max 
BG 10.82% 9.65% 2.80% 9.62% 18.83% 16.03% 0.04% 27.40% 
CZ 6.62% 8.40% 0.28% 4.20% 10.75% 10.48% 0.00% 34.26% 
DK 6.78% 6.80% 2.02% 3.94% 11.10% 9.08% 0.26% 25.31% 
GB 14.22% 18.65% 0.70% 5.63% 23.86% 23.15% 0.00% 82.38% 
HR 6.85% 11.12% 0.28% 2.59% 6.76% 6.47% 0.01% 28.88% 
HU 38.43% 25.29% 12.45% 35.04% 53.01% 40.56% 10.40% 81.83% 
PL 8.66% 13.38% 0.51% 1.42% 12.34% 11.83% 0.00% 42.58% 
RO 23.57% 17.65% 9.86% 25.48% 29.97% 20.11% 1.41% 59.55% 
SE 15.46% 20.48% 1.51% 7.62% 17.01% 15.50% 0.12% 69.65% 
Total 13.05% 17.04% 1.17% 4.67% 18.83% 17.66% 0.00% 82.38% 
 
Figure 48: Average by country for interbank deposits over TA, excluding "small banks" 
 
 
JRC - G.01 Unit    March 2015 
78 
 
Figure 49: Histogram of distribution of values of interbank deposits over TA, excluding “small” banks for Euro area 
and non-Euro area 
 
Figure 50: scatterplot of values of interbank deposits over TA vs TA, excluding “small” banks for Euro area and non-
Euro area 
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 Distribution of BRRD base to TA 
Here it is reported for reference purposes a histogram of the distribution of the ratio of the BRRD base to TA, within 
and outside the Euro area. 
Figure 51: histogram of the ratio of BRRD base to TA, excluding “small banks” for Euro and non-Euro area 
 
 
Table 42: Results of the estimates of intragroup based on BIS and ECB data, in terms of Total Assets 
Country 
Average 
intragroup as 
share of foreign 
IB 
Share of foreign 
IB 
Average 
intragroup as 
share of TA 
AT 9.4% 32.7% 2.2% 
BE 44.2% 94.1% 4.6% 
CY 14.1% 3.6% 1.5% 
DE 56.7% 74.5% 9.6% 
ES 33.3% 58.9% 6.6% 
FI 13.8% 4.0% 0.4% 
FR 52.6% 61.8% 9.5% 
GR 25.5% 52.9% 1.6% 
IE 53.8% 33.1% 15.5% 
IT 38.0% 37.4% 6.2% 
LU 12.4% 5.1% 3.1% 
NL* 63.4% 94.1% 9.2% 
PT 26.0% 46.5% 7.8% 
Overall median     6.2% 
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 Assessment of intragroup linkages by comparing ECB data 
Another approach to assess the relative magnitude of intragroup interbank is to make a comparison between 
aggregated and consolidated banking statistics, which are produced by ECB. This exercise is fraught with problems 
due to inconsistencies between definitions employed in the two sets of statistics which are due to them being 
created and used for very different purposes. 
This notwithstanding, a comparison is contained in the ECB occasional paper 140 of January 2013 by Borgioli, 
Gouveia and Labanca: “Financial stability analysis – insights gained from consolidated banking data from the EU”. 
Tables 4 and 5 in section 3 in particular compare total interbank loans and deposits and reported hereunder: 
Figure 52: Tables 4 and 5 from ECB occasional paper 140/2013. Total interbank loans under CBD and MFI statistics 
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ECB notes that: “in Table 4, CBD figures are more than 10% lower than MFI data (in terms of total assets the euro 
area difference is 2%), highlighting the importance of intra-group loans (that are netted out in CBD). This effect is 
particularly relevant in the case of Finland, Italy, France and Ireland. In a few countries CBD data actually exceed MFI 
data, meaning that the intra-group loans effect just described is less present or compensated for by important cross-
border branches/subsidiaries.” while “Table 5 shows that there are very large differences between MFI and CBD 
interbank deposits figures both at euro area and at country level. CBD values are around 50% lower than MFI values 
for the euro area as a whole, ranging from -1% in Malta to -76% in Ireland and France. This highlights the role of the 
group, and in particular of interbank loans, in providing funding in the different countries. Estonia is the only country 
where values for CBD are higher than MFI values” 
These conclusions, at least in their qualitative part, are in line with those which can be taken by looking at interbank 
as a proxy for intragroup: the distribution is very uneven between different countries, and the size of intragroup can 
be relevant compared to other liabilities. 
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8. Analysis on the potential impact of introducing a leverage ratio treatment of 
derivative liabilities in the calculation of the BRRD base 
Among all the liabilities which are included in the contribution base, derivative liabilities deserve special attention 
as the accounting standards for them are not harmonised in the EU and different approaches may in principle lead 
to very different outcomes. To overcome this level playing field issue, the Delegated Act requires derivatives to be 
accounted for as they are in the calculation of the leverage ratio under the Capital Requirements Regulation.39 This 
aims to ensure a harmonized approach in the treatment of derivatives. However, to avoid significant reductions in 
the BRRD base, this harmonized treatment proposed in the Delegated act cannot lead to more than 25% reduction 
in the total liabilities. 
As data on derivative liabilities have not been provided by the MS, JRC performed an estimate of derivatives by using 
the Bankscope data sample; this dataset reports balance sheet data at solo level. The original Bankscope sample 
includes 3,710 entities in the EU 28 area, but data on derivatives are missing for a large part of the database. After 
excluding banks that do not report data on derivatives, the final subsample is made of 809 banks corresponding to 
24,265 bn € in terms of total assets. With respect to the database (see Section 2.2), the Bankscope subsample 
including data on derivatives covers 17% of the sample size (809 over 4,639 credit institutions) and 65% of the overall 
total assets for the whole EU 28 area (that is 24,265 bn € over 37,614 bn €). This might lead to conclude that the 
most part of the missing observations in the Bankscope subsample concerns small banks.  
The analysis on derivatives has been performed along the lines of the analysis on the inclusion of the fourth pillar 
into the risk indicator (Section 6). The underlying assumption is that differences in the adopted accounting standards 
are more relevant for the largest banks selected for the analysis on pillar 4 (i.e. banks with total assets greater than 
30 bn € and covering 65% of cumulative total assets in each economic area). This implies that in the present analysis 
these banks are the only ones assumed to hold derivatives (hereafter referred to as “holding-derivatives” banks for 
convenience).  
To verify whether limiting the analysis to the biggest banks would be a too restrictive assumption, the cumulative 
distribution of derivative liabilities by total assets has been computed. The banks with total assets higher than 30 bn 
€ make up a subsample of 110 entities and represent 89% of the overall total assets in the sample. As can be seen 
in Figure 53, this point on the x-axis corresponds to almost all (i.e. 98.5% in the y-axis) the derivative liabilities.  
Figure 53: Cumulative distribution of derivative liabilities, EU 28 banks, Bankscope sample 
 
                                                          
39 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN 
JRC - G.01 Unit    March 2015 
83 
 
Table 43 reports some descriptive statistics on the ratio of derivative liabilities over total assets. The median value 
is 0.2% while the mean is located on the right-hand part of the distribution at a value of 2.6%. As this value is higher 
than the 75th percentile, this reveals the existence of a right long tail with few banks having extreme high values.  
Table 43: Descriptive statistics on the ratio of derivative liabilities to total assets, full sample 
Distribution 
Derivative 
Liabilities 
(as share 
of TA) 
Number of banks 809 
Minimum 0.00% 
25th percentile 0.02% 
Median 0.21% 
75th percentile 1.38% 
Maximum 89.76% 
Average 2.55% 
 
In order to analyse the distribution of derivative liabilities per size category, the sample has been divided into a 
number of buckets according to the total assets size. Table 44 reports descriptive statistics for the size categories. In 
general, the percentage of derivatives held by banks varies significantly among banks of different size categories 
with an increasing trend correlated to the size. Moreover, when looking at the columns reporting the 
minimum/maximum values, it appears that quite relative small/large amounts of derivatives can be held also by 
large/small banks. 
Table 44: Descriptive statistics on the ratio of derivative liabilities to total assets per size category 
Bucket Thresholds  
Number 
of banks 
Minimum 
25th 
percentile 
Median 
75th 
percentile 
Maximum Average 
Bucket 1 TA <= 300 mn 103 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.12% 12.39% 0.22% 
Bucket 2 TA > 300 mn & <= 1 bn 187 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.22% 15.49% 0.43% 
Bucket 3 TA > 1 bn & <= 15 bn 358 0.00% 0.03% 0.29% 1.30% 44.91% 1.69% 
Bucket 4 TA > 15 bn & <= 30 bn 51 0.06% 0.46% 1.36% 4.15% 24.84% 3.58% 
Bucket 5 TA > 30 bn  110 0.00% 1.36% 3.25% 12.24% 89.76% 10.67% 
 
Two major points come out from this analysis. On the one hand, the vast majority of the outstanding derivatives 
belongs to the largest banks. On the other hand, the share of derivatives held in each institution can significantly 
vary both among banks of different size categories and among banks of similar size. Nevertheless there is evidence 
that the percentage of derivative liabilities in the balance sheet tends to increase with the size of the bank.  
All results presented in the following analysis should be taken with caution as they rely on a limited dataset and on 
a set of working hypotheses, as detailed in the above section.  
The following scenario analysis focuses on the potential impact of excluding a part of derivative liabilities from the 
BRRD base when calculating the contributions to the RF. The following assumptions hold true:  
 Banks holding derivatives are the same entities selected for the analysis on the fourth pillar. It should be 
noted that banks have been picked according to criteria broadly in line with those proposed for the 
structural separation, i.e. banks with total assets greater than 30 bn € and up to 65% of cumulative total 
assets in each economic area. All other banks are assumed not having derivative liabilities.  
 The "holding-derivatives" banks cannot exclude more than 25% of their derivative liabilities from the BRRD 
base.  
 All the "holding-derivatives" banks hold an amount of derivative liabilities equal to 10.67% of their total 
assets. This percentage is the average value of derivative liabilities scaled to total assets for banks with total 
assets above 30 bn €, as reported in Table 44.  
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The results one can derive from the present analysis are the following:  
 the discount for the "holding-derivatives" banks in terms of BRRD base and contributions to the RF, 
considering both the flat and the risk-adjusted contribution.  
 The additional burden for the other banks.  
 The cumulative distribution of the risk-adjusted contributions by TA.  
Results will be presented according to two different modelling of the composite risk indicator:  
 3 pillars only (referred to as 3 pillars); 
 4 pillars under the two scenarios presented in Section 6, i.e. when the 4th pillar is built by assigning the 
largest value to the largest banks and the average value to the other banks (4 pillars - average) and when it 
is built by assigning the largest value to the largest banks and the minimum value to the others (4 pillars - 
minmax). 
 
 Reduction for the "holding-derivatives" banks  
Derivatives are estimated by applying the average ratio of derivatives over total assets computed for banks falling 
into bucket 5 in Table 44 (i.e. 10.67%).   
Table 45 presents summary statistics on the distributions of the percentage variations of the BRRD base and 
contributions (flat and risk-adjusted) for the “holding-derivatives” banks in the Euro area. In this table the minimum 
values represent the maximum discount and vice versa.  
It appears that an average 4% reduction in the BRRD base translates in an average 1.5% reduction in the 
contributions. No significant difference comes out when comparing the flat and the risk-adjusted contribution 
variations. The reduction in contributions is just slightly compensated by the introduction of the fourth pillar.  
Table 45: Percentage variations in the BRRD base, flat fee and risk-adjusted contributions for the "holding-
derivatives" banks in the Euro area 
 
BRRD base Flat fee 
Risk-adjusted contribution 
3 Pillars 
4 Pillars - 
average 
4 Pillars - 
minmax 
Average -3.8% -1.5% -1.5% -1.4% -1.4% 
Median -3.4% -1.1% -1.1% -1.0% -1.0% 
Minimum -11.7% -9.6% -9.5% -9.4% -9.4% 
maximum -2.7% -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
 Additional burden for the other large banks 
If a discount is granted to a specific category of banks and a certain target level has to be reached, it is important to 
quantify the additional burden imposed to the other entities.  
To reach this goal, the first step is to derive the formulas to calculate the percentage increase in the burden of all 
other large banks that do not hold derivatives.  
Flat fee 
If no reduction is granted on the amount of derivatives, for each non-small bank not holding derivatives i, the flat 
fee would be:  
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑗
∗ (𝑇 − 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) 
where 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 represents an element in the group of non-small banks J, T is the target 
and 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎  is the overall amount paid by small banks under the SRM. 
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If a maximum percentage reduction 𝛼 on the amount of accounted derivatives is introduced, then the new flat fee 
would be:  
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡?̃? =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗 − 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑗
∗ (𝑇 − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) 
where 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is a generic one among the largest, derivative-holding banks, with 𝐾 ⊂ 𝐽, D denotes derivative 
liabilities, T is the target and ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎  is the overall amount paid by small banks within this new framework. 
The percentage increase in the burden for all other banks that do not hold derivatives is:  
(𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖̃ − 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖)
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
=
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗 − 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐷𝑘𝑘𝑗
∗
(𝑇 − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)
(𝑇 − 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)
− 1 
Given a sample of banks, this factor is a constant for each bank. Table 46 below reports the results assuming  equal 
to 25%.  
Table 46: Annual additional payment for big non-holding derivatives banks, as share of flat fee, Euro area 
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗𝑗   
(bn€) 
 ∑ 𝐷𝑘𝑘   
(bn€) 
(𝑇 − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) 
(th€) 
(𝑇 − 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) 
(th€) 
Percentage 
additional 
burden 
20,126 1,886 6,236,037.798 6,236,038.128 +2.40% 
 
Risk-adjusted contributions 
The same steps can be used to derive the formula for the additional burden in the risk based contributions system. 
The percentage increase between contributions computed with (𝑐?̃?) and without (𝑐𝑖) the reduction in derivatives is:  
(𝑐?̃? − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑐𝑖
=  
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗 ∙ 𝑅𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗 ∙ 𝑅𝑗 − 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐷𝑘 ∙ 𝑅𝑘𝑘𝑗
∗
(𝑇 − ?̃?𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)
(𝑇 − 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)
− 1 
where Rj is the risk adjustment. Table 47 reports the results assuming  equal to 25%.  
Table 47: Annual additional payment for big non-holding derivatives banks, as share of risk-adjusted fee, Euro area 
Risk indicator 
modelling 
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑗 ∙ 𝑅𝑗𝑗  
(bn€) 
 ∑ 𝐷𝑘 ∙ 𝑅𝑘𝑘   
(bn€) 
Percentage 
additional 
burden 
3 pillars 26,646 2,541 +2.44% 
4 pillars average 28,076 2,740 +2.50% 
4 pillars minmax 27,948 2,750 +2.53% 
 
 Cumulative contributions  
Plots from Figure 54 to Figure56 compare the cumulative distributions of risk adjusted contributions by total assets 
(alternatively computed including 3 and 4 pillars, in this second case both average and minmax modelling) under the 
baseline scenario when the accounting treatment of derivatives applies (blue line) and the alternative leverage ratio 
treatment (red line). Table 48 shows the exact percentage of contributions paid by Euro area big banks accounting 
for 85% of total assets under the base scenarios and with the derivative discount. 
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Figure 54: Cumulative distributions of risk-adjusted contributions (3 pillars) by TA, Euro area, zoom around the 85% 
of TA 
 
Figure 55: Cumulative distributions of risk-adjusted contributions (4 pillars - average) by TA, Euro area, zoom around 
the 85% of TA 
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Figure56: Cumulative distributions of risk-adjusted contributions (4 pillars - minmax) by TA, Euro area, zoom around 
the 85% of TA 
 
Table 48: Share of contributions paid by Euro area banks accounting for 85% of TA 
 Accounting 
treatment of 
derivatives 
Leverage ratio 
treatment of 
derivatives 
3 pillars 89.06% 88.80% 
4 pillars - average 89.62% 89.37% 
4 pillars - minmax 89.95% 89.70% 
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9. Phasing-in the SRM: an analysis of different blending options 
 Introduction 
Contributions computed under the BRRD and SRM frameworks appear to be rather different, as the former depend 
upon the national target, i.e. the sum of covered deposits of a specific country only, while the latter depend upon 
the overall target at Euro area level. In particular, contributions of banks established in MS with a high level of 
covered deposits will in general decrease when moving to the national system to the SRM, while contributions of 
those banks established in MS with fewer covered deposits will in general increase. 
To limit the effects of this difference, the proposal of the Commission for a Council Implementing Act foresees an 
adjustment mechanism during the transitional period by way of a gradual phasing in of the SRM methodology. JRC 
analysed different blending options that could be implemented during this transitional phase, which should start in 
2016, when contributions for the SRM will start to be raised and should end 8 years later, when the target level of 
the SRF will be reached. 
 Reasons for the deviations between the BRRD and SRM aggregated contributions 
This section aims at detailing via mathematical formulas the reasons causing the deviations between contributions 
under the national and the Euro area systems. This can be exploited by computing the ratio of the aggregated SRM 
contributions to the aggregate BRRD contributions for a generic participating MS.  
The pure flat contribution40 of bank i under the SRM is: 
𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀 =
𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
∙ 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
 
where the target is expressed as a fixed percentage (, i.e. 1%/8) of the sum of covered deposits of all banks 
belonging to the Euro area. 
The aggregated contributions over all banks within a generic participating country N under the SRM can be computed 
as it follows: 
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀 =
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
∙ 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 .
𝑖∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖∈𝑁
 
This can be decomposed as it follows: 
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀 =
𝑖∈𝑁
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 )
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 + ∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∉𝑁
∙ 𝛼 ∙ (∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖∉𝑁𝑖∈𝑁
) 
The aggregate BRRD contributions in a generic country N is merely equal to the national target: 
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 = 𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 .
𝑖∈𝑁𝑖∈𝑁
 
For a generic country N, the ratio of the aggregate SRM to the aggregate BRRD contributions is:  
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀
𝑖∈𝑁
∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷
𝑖∈𝑁
=
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 + ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖∉𝑁𝑖∈𝑁
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 ) + ∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖)𝑖∉𝑁
∙
∑ (𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 )
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖 .𝑖∈𝑁
 
If the above ratio is roughly equal to 1, aggregate contributions under the SRM and the BRRD are very similar. This 
ratio is composed by two factors. The first factor is a constant as it is the ratio of the overall covered deposits in the 
Euro area to the overall BRRD bases in the Euro area. The second factor is country-specific as it is the ratio of the 
aggregate BRRD bases to the aggregate covered deposits within each country.  
                                                          
40 For the sake of simplicity, this formula refers to the SRM pure flat contribution. The rationale behind the computations does 
not change if considering the SRM risk-adjusted contribution.  
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 Phase-in mechanism 
This section presents the contributions due according to the phase-in methodology during the transitional period 
towards the SRF.  
Small banks are excluded from the phase-in mechanism. Under the BRRD regulation (in year 2015) they are assumed 
to pay the minimum between the lump sum associated to the bucket where each small bank falls and the pure flat 
calculated under the national target. Under the transitional period towards the SRF they are assumed to pay the 
minimum between the lump sum payment and the pure flat calculated under the joint euro area target. Thus, the 
blending of BRRD and SRM payments has been applied to non-small banks only.  
From a technical perspective, the contribution each individual non-small bank in each participating MS has to pay 
during the phase-in is a linear convex combination of BRRD and SRM contributions. This combination provides for 
increasing weights of the SRM part during the transitional period, up to a final weight of 100% in the last year. The 
schedule of the weights is shown in Table 49. 
Table 49: Schedule of the share of SRM contribution used in the calculation of total contributions during the 
transition period 
Year 

share of SRM 
contribution

share of BRRD 
contribution
1 40.00% 60.00% 
2 60.00% 40.00% 
3 66.67% 33.33% 
4 72.33% 27.67% 
5 80.00% 20.00% 
6 86.67% 13.33% 
7 93.33% 6.67% 
8 100.00% 0% 
 
In each year t during the transitional period, the contribution of each non-small bank i participating in the banking 
union is:  
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐼𝑛 = 𝛽𝑡 ∙ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑅𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡) ∙ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷  
where i ∈ 𝐿 represents an entity in the group of non-small banks L and, in any given t during the transitional period, 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑅𝑀and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 are computed according the following formulas:  
𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀 =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀
𝑖∈€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
∙ (𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖 ∈ €𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
− 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ €𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 ) 
𝑐𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷
𝑖∈𝑁
∙ (𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖∈𝑁
− 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑁 )  
where 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 = 𝑇𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 − 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖  , 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ €𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 represents the overall contributions of small banks in the euro 
area and 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑁 represents the overall contributions of small banks in country N. 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀  is the risk indicator 
computed for all non-small banks in the Euro area (the least risky bank in the Euro area gets 0.8 and the riskiest 
banks in the Eurozone gets 1.5) and 𝑅𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 is the risk indicator computed for non-small banks in country N only (the 
least risky bank in country N gets 0.8 and the riskiest banks in country N gets 1.5, before applying the re-
normalization to assure that the target is reached).  
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9.3.1 Contributions by size category 
Figure 57 compares phase-in (red dots), BRRD (blue dots) and SRM risk-adjusted contributions (green dots) during 
the first year of the transitional period. It has to be noted that blue dots present a much higher variance than the 
green dots as under the BRRD system banks of similar size and riskiness can pay very different fees if they belong to 
different MS.  
Only results for the first year are presented, as they show the largest possible differences between phase-in and 
SRM contributions and thus produce “perverse” effects. A set of four zoomed in plots (from Figure 58 to Figure 61) 
depict the above-mentioned payments for the categories of banks defined upon the BRRD base size in Section 5.  
Figure 57: Comparison of Phase-in, BRRD and SRM contributions, year 1 of the transitional period 
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Figure 58: Comparison of Phase-in, BRRD and SRM contributions, year 1 of the transitional period – zoom on S 
category 
 
Figure 59: Comparison of Phase-in, BRRD and SRM contributions, year 1 of the transitional period – zoom on M 
category 
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Figure 60: Comparison of Phase-in, BRRD and SRM contributions, year 1 of the transitional period – zoom on L 
category 
 
Figure 61: Comparison of Phase-in, BRRD and SRM contributions, year 1 of the transitional period – zoom on XL 
category 
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 Proportionality principle during the transitional period: intermediate banks 
The JRC tested the potential effect of an optional special treatment applicable to all non-small institutions41 with 
total assets below or equal to 3 bn€.  
This category of “intermediate” banks would pay the highest lump sum (50 th €) for their first 300 million € of BRRD 
base and the phase-in contribution for the rest. Intermediate banks with BRRD base below 300 million € would pay 
50 th € only.42 To formalize this contribution rule, let I be the set of intermediate banks and L be the set of non-small 
and non-intermediate banks. Moreover, let ∪ means the union of two different sets and ∩ represents the 
intersection between two sets. 
A generic intermediate bank  𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 benefiting from the special treatment would pay ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐼𝑛, defined as:  
?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐼𝑛 = 50𝑘 +  𝛽𝑡 ∙ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑅𝑀 + (1 − 𝛽𝑡) ∙ ?̃?𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
where, in any given t: 
?̃?𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀 =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖̃ ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖̃ ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝑅𝑀
𝑖∈(𝐼∪𝐿)∩€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
∙ (𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖 ∈(𝐼∪𝐿)∩€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
− 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ €𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 − 50𝑘 ∗ 𝑁𝐼,€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) 
?̃?𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 =
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖̃ ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷
∑ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖̃ ∙ 𝑅𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷
𝑖∈(𝐼∪𝐿)∩𝑁
∙ (𝛼 ∙ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
− 𝑇𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝑁 − 50𝑘 ∗ 𝑁𝐼,𝑁) 
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖̃ = {
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐿
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 − 300𝑚𝑙𝑛, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∧  𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 > 300𝑚𝑙𝑛
0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 ∧  𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷𝑖 ≤ 300𝑚𝑙𝑛
 
and 𝑁𝐼,€𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎  and NI,N are the number of intermediate banks in the euro area and in country N, respectively. 
Table 50 reports summary statistics on the intermediate banks in each MS participating to the banking union.  
Table 50: Statistics on intermediate banks, sample figures  
Economic 
area 
Number of banks Total Assets BRRD base 
All 
banks 
Interm
ediate 
banks 
Intermedi
ate banks 
(as % of 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks  
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks 
(as % of TA 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks (as % of 
BRRD base all 
banks) 
AT 668 55 8%  879,305,789  72,715,957   8% 610,421,541 43,084,142 7% 
BE 45 14 31%  935,583,114   20,370,740  2% 588,932,347  11,127,538 2% 
CY 10 4 40%  54,850,025   4,386,951  8% 26,162,767  2,020,558 8% 
DE 1740 643 37%  8,266,923,037   824,442,513  10% 6,159,144,464  459,095,560 7% 
EE 6 1 17%  12,797,090   485,110  4% 6,274,212  381,064 6% 
ES 62 21 34%  2,409,149,066  26,483,061 1% 1,529,801,692 15,616,069 1% 
FI 266 14 5%  486,844,150   21,147,737  4% 394,116,010  7,239,746 2% 
FR 195 42 22%  6,466,453,443   50,801,556  1% 5,265,822,355  38,824,991 1% 
GR 10 2 20%  316,886,598   3,427,542  1% 169,938,198  1,387,906 1% 
IE 31 7 23%  978,971,513   14,874,375  2% 833,190,116  8,991,914 1% 
IT 595 228 38%  3,162,595,451   259,090,111  8% 2,338,762,774 173,702,764 7% 
LT 7 1 14%  16,878,730   849,011  5% 9,559,361  712,829 7% 
LU 105 40 38%  634,960,991  53,236,476 8% 559,634,807 45,282,115 8% 
LV 19 9 47%  24,908,053   10,971,585  44% 16,221,678  7,491,839 46% 
MT 19 9 47%  27,510,463   9,297,074  34% 15,733,147  6,735,390 43% 
NL 48 11 23%  2,033,738,687   13,986,199  1% 1,488,773,348  9,998,666 1% 
                                                          
41 For the sake of clarity, a bank is defined as small if it has a BRRD base below 300 mln € and total assets below 1 bn €.  
42 In the final database, 5 banks with BRRD base below 300 mln € belong to the intermediate banks category. JRC found that 3 
banks out of 5 would be penalized by the 50 th€ lump sum as they would pay less when no special treatment is applied.  
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Economic 
area 
Number of banks Total Assets BRRD base 
All 
banks 
Interm
ediate 
banks 
Intermedi
ate banks 
(as % of 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks  
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks 
(as % of TA 
all banks) 
All banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks 
(th €) 
Intermediate 
banks (as % of 
BRRD base all 
banks) 
PT 123 13 11%  442,544,164   17,469,786  4% 279,930,483  13,819,693 5% 
SI 17 9 53%  36,853,241   14,290,744  39% 19,125,053  7,937,059 42% 
SK 12 4 33%  50,806,559  5,680,511 11% 21,330,174 2,281,325 11% 
Euro area 3,978 1,127 28% 27,238,560,163 1,424,007,039 5% 20,332,874,525 855,731,168 4% 
 
Figure 62 compares phase-in contributions due by intermediate banks (each dot in the graph represents an 
intermediate bank) under the special regime (green dots) and under the general phase-in rule when no special 
treatment is granted to them (blue dots). In order to better visualize intermediate banks that could be penalized by 
the special provision – thus increasing their contribution – an accessory plot draws the variation of payments when 
moving from the general phase-in to the phase-in with the special provision for intermediate banks. Following the 
same rationale mentioned in Section 9.3, only results for the first year are presented. The special regime for 
intermediate banks effectively reduces the contributory burden for the vast majority of them, but there are few 
banks (those with an upward stem in the accessory plot) which would pay more under the special regime. 
 
Figure 62: Comparison of phase-in contributions of intermediate banks under the special regime (green dots) and 
under no special treatment (blue dots), year 1 of the transitional period. Accessory plot: variation in payments of 
intermediate banks 
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10. Conclusions 
JRC supported DG MARKT in the preparation of the second level legislation on banks contributions to national/single 
RF. The analyses covered a large number of issues related to the technical framework for determining how such 
contributions should be defined, taking into account the existing legislation (BRRD and SRMR). 
To perform this exercise, JRC built a database assembling individual bank unconsolidated balance sheet data directly 
provided by the MS. Using data directly provided by the MS, JRC assessed the comprehensiveness and coherence of 
such data, ran a number of checks to detect inconsistencies and estimated, where possible, missing data. After all 
these checks, the final database comprises around 4,600 banks in the EU 28, accounting for 37 600 billion € of 
unconsolidated total assets. 
The analyses started with the development of a robust composite risk indicator measuring the risk adjustment 
introduced in the BRRD and SRMR. The composite indicator is obtained aggregating a set of balance sheet indicators, 
identified by DG MARKT and the Expert Group, grouped into pillars of risk. Following composite indicators best 
practices, JRC suggested how to properly combine the pillars into a single risk measure. JRC analyses also allowed 
defining the way to treat outlier values in the distributions of the indicators via discretization methods. 
JRC contributed to choose the technical specifications for determining banks contributions. The approach proposes 
that contributions depend on bank size: small banks are required to pay a lump sum depending only on BRRD base; 
the others contribute to reach the leftover target proportionally to their BRRD base, corrected by a risk adjustment. 
This depends on the value of the composite risk indicator and ranges between 0.8 and 1.5. JRC assessed various 
options for defining the lump sum system, and quantified both the advantage for small banks of introducing such 
approach and the burden covered by the rest of the system. JRC also examined the effect of using alternative ranges 
of variation for the risk correction applied to large banks.  
JRC analyses focused on the distribution of contributions by banks’ size: results showed that the greater contributors 
to the (S)RF were the largest banks. For instance, in the Euro area the largest 261 banks, which represent 85% of 
total assets, cover around 90% of the contributions. The analyses also demonstrated that in general the smallest 
banks, among those paying a risk-adjusted contribution, would tend to get a downward risk based correction and 
therefore to a large extent pay less than the flat contributions. On the other hand, the largest banks mostly get an 
increase in their contributions with respect to the flat fees. Small banks, though representing 55% of the whole 
number of institutions in the Euro Area, account only for 2% of total assets and their contributions would cover 0.3% 
of the yearly target to be collected. 
Following the discussion at the political level, JRC also assessed some technical issues related to how the BRRD base 
should be computed. The focus was on the treatment of intragroup exposures and on the accounting of derivatives. 
Due to the lack of individual bank-level data both on the level of intra-group exposure and on the structure of groups, 
JRC could only provide an estimate of the potential average size and variation of intragroup exposures in each 
Member State, in comparison to the contributions base. For derivative liabilities, individual data were lacking and it 
was possible to estimate averages values for groups of banks of different dimensions only.  
Finally, JRC tested the impact on banks contributions of different options for the phasing in of the SRF calculations  
and the potential effect of an optional special treatment applicable to institutions with total assets below 3 billion 
€.  
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A.1 Annex 1: Example of how to compute the composite indicator for a sample of three banks 
This Annex details with a concrete example how to compute the composite indicator for a set of three banks. The 
indicator data for the banks are the following: 
Bank Name 
Asset 
Composition 
(RWA/TA) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
(CE/TA) 
Capital Ratio 
(Regulatory 
Cap/RWA) 
Net Loans 2 
Deposits 
Share IB+IB- 
Bank 1 40.30% 4.99% 19.02% 113.49% 3.11% 
Bank 2 64.38% 12.73% 24.40% 74.18% 0.71% 
Bank 3 102.30% 14.99% 36.56% 102.06% 0.07% 
 
The composite indicator is aggregated starting from single indicators by means of the following weights: 
 
Pillars 
Pillar 1  
(Risk exposure) 
Pillar 2  
(Stability and variety of 
funding) 
Pillar 3 
(Importance of the institution to 
the stability of the financial system) 
Weights of the 
pillars 
62.5% 25% 12.5% 
Indicators 
Asset 
Composition 
(RWA/TA) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
(CE/TA) 
Capital Ratio 
(Regulatory 
Cap/RWA) 
Net Loans 2 Deposits Share IB+IB- 
Weights of the 
indicators 
33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100% 100% 
 
First, the data must be rescaled between 1 and 1000: 
STEP 1 
Asset 
Composition 
(RWA/TA) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
(CE/TA) 
Capital Ratio 
(Regulatory 
Cap/RWA) 
Net Loans 2 
Deposits 
Share IB+IB- 
Bank 1  1   1  1   1,000   1,000  
Bank 2  389   774  307   1   209  
Bank 3  1,000   1,000  1,000   710   1  
 
Then, data are modified to account for the sign assigned. In this case, the second and third ratios are left unchanged. 
 
Sign +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 
STEP 2 
Asset 
Composition 
(RWA/TA) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
(CE/TA) 
Capital Ratio 
(Regulatory 
Cap/RWA) 
Net Loans 2 
Deposits 
Share IB+IB- 
Bank 1  1,000   1  1   1   1  
Bank 2  612   774  307   1,000   792  
Bank 3  1   1,000  1,000   291   1,000  
 
Now one can compute weighted arithmetic averages within pillars: in this specific case, only pillar 1 is the result of 
the weighted average, the others are simply the values of the ratios. The indicators in pillar one are combined using 
the three weights (all equal to 0.333). 
 
STEP 3 
Pillar 1  
(Risk exposure) 
Pillar 2  
(Stability and variety of 
funding) 
Pillar 3 
(Importance of the institution to the 
stability of the financial system) 
Bank 1 1000*0.333+1*0.333+1*0.333 = 334 1 1 
Bank 2 612*0.333+774*0.333+307*0.333= 565 1000 792 
Bank 3 1*0.333+1000*0.333+1000*0.333 = 667 291 1000 
 
 
 
 
 
JRC - G.01 Unit    March 2015 
97 
 
Finally, one can aggregate results across pillars to come up with the composite indicator. 
 
STEP 4 Composite Indicator 
Bank 1 334^0.625*1^0.25*1^0.125=38 
Bank 2 565^0.625*1000^0.25*792^0.125=680 
Bank 3 667^0.625*291^0.25*1000^0.125=570 
 
The values obtained have to be transformed: 
 
STEP 5 Composite Indicator 
Bank 1 1000-38=962 
Bank 2 1000-680=320 
Bank 3 1000-570=430 
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References on composite indicators 
• Paruolo, P., Saisana, M., Saltelli, A. 2013. Ratings and rankings: Voodoo or Science? Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society – A 176(3), 609-634. 
• Saisana, M., D’Hombres, B., Saltelli, A. 2011. Rickety numbers: Volatility of university rankings and policy 
implications, Research Policy 40, 165-177. 
• Saisana, M., and Saltelli, A., 2011, Rankings and Ratings: Instructions for use, Hague Journal on the Rule of 
Law 3(2), 247-268.  
• OECD/EC JRC. 2008. Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide. Paris: 
OECD. 
• Saisana, M., Saltelli, A., Tarantola, S., 2005. Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques as tools for the 
analysis and validation of composite indicators. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A 168(2), 307-323. 
For more information see the over 100 JRC audits on composite indicators (undertaken upon request of the index 
developers) at: http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu 
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A.2 Annex 2: Arithmetic versus geometric average 
Let {𝐼1,𝑛, 𝐼2,𝑛, … , 𝐼𝑁,𝑛} be a vector of N risk indicators of bank n to be aggregated and {𝑤1,𝑛, 𝑤2,𝑛, … , 𝑤𝑁,𝑛} be their 
corresponding vector of weights such that they sum up to 1. 
In the arithmetic average the indicators are weighted and summed.  
𝐶𝐼𝑛 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖,𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=  𝐼1,𝑛 ∗ 𝑤1 +  … + 𝐼𝑁,𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑁  
In the geometric average indicators are first raised to their weights and then multiplied: 
𝐶𝐼𝑛 = ∏ 𝐼𝑖,𝑛
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐼1,𝑛
𝑤1 ∗ … ∗  𝐼𝑁,𝑛
𝑤𝑁  
Advantages of geometric average versus the arithmetic average are the following. 
 The geometric average does not suffer from compensability, i.e. poor performance in one dimension cannot be 
fully compensated by good performance in another. 
 The geometric average rewards balance by penalizing uneven performance between dimensions. 
 The geometric average encourages improvements in the weak dimensions. 
The following example illustrates these properties. Let us consider two banks (Bank 1 and Bank 2) with three risk 
indicators reported in Table 51 (columns A, B, C). In this framework it is assumed that the higher the indicator, the 
better the performance. 
Table 51: Example comparing the arithmetic and geometric averages. 
 A B C D E F G 
  
Indicator 
1 
Indicator2 
Indicator 
3 
Standard 
deviation 
Arithmeti
c average 
Geometri
c average 
Bank 2 
improvement 
Bank 1 0.496 0.270 0.346 0.115 0.371 0.359  
Bank 2 0.580 0.439 0.140 0.225 0.386 0.329  
Bank 2 
Scenario A 0.680 0.439 0.140  0.419 0.347  5.5% 
Bank 2 
Scenario B 0.580 0.439 0.240  0.419  0.394  19.8% 
 
Column D computes the standard deviations of the three values for the two banks: results show that values for Bank 
1 are quite homogeneous (the standard deviation is low), while those for bank 2 are more dispersed (the standard 
deviation is higher). Columns E and F show the values of the arithmetic and geometric averages: arithmetic average 
for Bank 1 is lower than that for Bank 2 (0.371 versus 0.386), while results for the geometric one are the opposite 
(0.359 versus 0.329).  
One can immediately see that the arithmetic average suffers from compensability: although Bank 2 is bad performing 
in indicator 3, its arithmetic average is higher than for Bank 1 due to the high value of indicator 1. This is not the case 
for the geometric average. 
Now some indicators of Bank 2 are modified by a fixed amount (0.1): in scenario A indicator 1, which was already 
the highest (and thus the best) for bank 2, is increased by 0.1; in scenario B the worst indicator, indicator 3, is 
increased by the same quantity. Columns E and F show the corresponding arithmetic and geometric averages. 
The following results can be highlighted: 
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 The arithmetic averages under the two scenarios are equal (0.419), because the arithmetic average is only 
affected by the overall absolute increase/decrease in any indicator. In other words, improving on a bad or well 
performing dimension is not accounted for by the arithmetic average.  
 The geometric averages, on the contrary, change in the two scenarios. When the best indicator increases 
(Scenario A), the corresponding geometric average increases by 5.5% (see column G), while when the worst 
indicator increase (and thus improves), the geometric average noticeably increases, by around 20%. This shows 
that the geometric average is extremely sensitive not only to the absolute increase in one indicators’ value, but 
also to its performance. In other words the geometric average rewards more for improvements in poor 
dimensions. For this reason, it would be desirable to use the geometric average when combining different 
dimensions (in the case of the composite indicator, the different pillars within a single value). 
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A.3 Annex 3: An example of right tail treatments at work 
This example shows how discretization and winsorization work. The indicator used is Asset composition (RWA/TA) 
for Euro area large banks. In raw data (see Figure 63), around 1600 banks have a value between roughly 0.7 and 0 
(see zoom), and around 200 banks have values going from 0.7 to the extreme value of roughly 10. 
 
Figure 63: Raw data (no right tail treatment) on the asset composition indicator. The bottom plot is a zoom. 
 
 
 
Figure 64 shows that when normalizing this leads the banks with the value of 10 to be assigned a value of 1000, 
while all 1600 banks with values between 0 (no risk) to 0.7 (considerable risk) are concentrated in the span 1-100. 
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This leads the banks at the top to be considered extremely high risk in the composite, irrespective of its scoring on 
other dimensions, while banks with ratios in the 0.6-1 range would be considered extremely low risk. 
Figure 64: Data on the asset composition indicator (RWA/TA) normalized in the 1-1000 range without right tail 
treatment 
 
When applying the discretization (Figure 65), based on the size of the sample and on characteristics of this indicator, 
the sample is divided in 20 buckets each of which contains an identical number of points. This correctly pushes the 
points with a value around 0.7 to the top end of the distribution, but as everybody has been redistributed and the 
indicator is based on relative risk, the impact of this spreading of the distribution is mitigated. At the same time, 
extreme values will all be grouped in the top bucket. 
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Figure 65: Data on the asset composition indicator normalized in the 1-1000 range after discretization to treat the 
right tail 
 
With a “light” winsorization treatment (1% of the data, in this case – see Figure 66 top plot), the bank with an 
RWA/TA ratio of 0.7 is receiving a value of slightly less than 700, and 1% of the whole sample is going to receive an 
identical value of 1000, which is rather far from the center of the mass of the distribution.  
 
Figure 66: Data on the asset composition indicator normalized in the 1-1000 range after light (1% - top plot) or 
strong (10% - bottom plot) winsorization to treat the right tail 
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Finally, a strong winsorization (but still considered perfectly reasonable in statistical use with banking data 
distributions: by way of example the FDIC “discards” 10% of its sample before calculating the ranges to be used for 
each indicator) pushes the indicator value for the bank with an RWA/TA ratio of about 0.7 to almost 1000 (see Figure 
66 bottom plot). However, in this case 10% of the sample has now a value of 1000. These banks will not have a value 
of the composite as far off from the mass of all other banks in this case, as many other banks have relatively high 
values now, but still this will tend to create a large “clump” of banks with identical or very similar values of the total 
indicator. 
Figure 67: Comparison between the distributions of the indicator RWA/TA with different right tail treatment 
 
Figure 68 to Figure 71show a comparison between the distributions of the other where different tail treatments are 
applied. 
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Figure 68: Comparison between the distributions of the indicator Leverage ratio with different right tail treatment 
 
 
Figure 69: Comparison between the distributions of the indicator Capital ratio with different right tail treatment  
 
JRC - G.01 Unit    March 2015 
106 
 
Figure 70: Comparison between the distributions of the indicator Net loans to deposits ratio with different right tail 
treatment 
 
Figure 71: Comparison between the distributions of the indicator Share of interbank with different right tail 
treatment 
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